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In 1962, the corporation law scholar Bayless Manning wrote, in a 
passage famous to corporate law scholars, that “[C]orporation law, as a 
field of intellectual effort, is dead in the United States.”  Looking back, 
most scholars have agreed, concluding that corporation law from the 1940s 
to the 1970s was stagnant, only rescued from its doldrums by the triumph 
of modern finance and the theory of the firm in the 1980s.  What a strange 
time, though, for corporation law to be “dead”—the same decades that the 
American corporation had seized the commanding heights of the world 
economy, and gripped the imagination of social and political theorists.  
This Article takes a new look at mid-century corporation law, situating it 
within larger economic and political developments, in order to explain the 
distinctive features of corporate law in the “long 1950s,” why the field 
appeared vibrant at the time, and how later changes in the American 
political economy led most to eventually agree with Manning’s diagnosis. 
In the process, it aims not merely to restore a lost episode to the history of 
American law but to tell readers something about the nature of corporate 
law and how it changes from era to era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1962, Yale Law professor Bayless Manning wrote, in a passage 
well-known to corporate law scholars, that: 
[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead 
in the United States.  When American law ceased to take 
the ‘corporation’ seriously, the entire body of law that had 
been built upon that intellectual construct slowly 
perforated and rotted away.  We have nothing left but our 
great empty corporation statutes—towering skyscrapers of 
rusted girders, internally welded together but containing 
nothing but wind.
1
 
Manning’s striking comment—buried in a footnote!—was aimed 
specifically at elements of American corporate law that, he believed, 
 
 1.  Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).  The best reflections on Manning’s comment that 
I have found are in J. WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 10, 154–58 (1970). 
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remained mired in nineteenth-century formalism, reflecting an obsession 
with corporate personhood long discarded by more sophisticated students 
of the American corporation.
2
  Yet his comment has been taken more 
generally as the final word on the corporate law scholarship that held sway 
in the decades around the mid-century. 
Between Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner Means’ 1932 book The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, which identified the problem of 
“separation of ownership and control” as central to corporate law, and the 
law-and-economics work of the 1970s, so the story runs, nothing much 
happened in corporation law, certainly nothing worth remembering.
3
  With 
the subsiding of debates over corporate personhood in the 1920s,
4
 the nigh-
universal adoption by the 1930s of enabling statutes that gave corporate 
framers broad powers to vary the corporate form,
5
 and the abandonment of 
many of the hopes and illusions surrounding shareholder democracy,
6
 it 
appeared that corporation law’s foundational issues had been settled.  By 
mid-century, as Delaware Chancellor William Allen concluded years later, 
“nothing remained to engage the wit and the energy of those with a taste 
for discovery and construction.”
7
  Writing in 1984, Roberta Romano noted 
that corporation law had long been “an uninspiring field for research even 
to some of its most astute students,”
8
 while others have said that as of the 
early 1970s “corporation law was more or less dead,”
9
 and that for decades 
 
 2.  This is addressed more in Section III, infra.  On corporate personhood debates, see 
Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1478–82 (1987); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 201, 205–20 (1990). 
 3.  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 4 (1932); see also Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. 
LEGAL ED. 342 (2005) (discussing why the revolution in corporate law during the 1980s was 
not fortuitous, and also discussing the impact of that revolution on corporate legal 
scholarship and practice). Some groundbreaking work in corporate law and economics, 
notably that of Henry Manne, was done in the 1960s, but the field as a whole only caught 
fire a decade later.  William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: 
Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1989); Brian R. Cheffins, 
The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 456, 481 (2004). 
 4.  See Mark, supra note 2, at 1478–82. 
 5.  See, e.g., Wilber G. Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury Corporation Statutes, 23 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 187–88 (1958). 
 6.  But see infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 263 (1992). 
 8.  Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 
923 (1984). 
 9.  Richard Booth, Five Decades of Corporation Law: From Conglomeration to 
Equity Compensation, 53 VILL. L. REV. 459, 460 (2008). 
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before the 1980s it was “the sleepiest of legal fields,”
10
 or worst of all, 
“simply boring.”
11
  Only the development of law–and–economics 
approaches to the corporation in the 1970s and 1980s, drawing on the 
theory of the firm and modern finance, would revitalize the field.
12
 
So goes the conventional wisdom, but is it right?  To some extent, the 
judgment is subjective and so can’t be questioned; if the field was 
intellectually dead to Manning in 1962, or uninspiring to Romano in the 
1970s, then that’s what it was.  But it is also an objective judgment:  that 
corporate law scholarship during this period was dull, uninspired, and well 
forgotten.  And this poses a significant historical puzzle, for in the 1950s 
the American corporation seemed to bestride the world.  Corporations (or 
at least large, public ones), many believed, controlled the American 
economy, dictated its politics, imposed a conformist straitjacket on 
American society, and manipulated individual tastes and mores.  Many of 
the nation’s best-known economists and social theorists, from Peter 
Drucker and John Kenneth Galbraith to David Riesman and C. Wright 
Mills, took “corporate power” as a central concern.  In political science, 
pluralist theories of politics held sway, which explained political outcomes 
as the result of competition between “countervailing powers,” chief among 
them corporations.  Why then was corporate law, a field devoted to 
studying power relationships within the corporation,
13
 perceived as 
moribund from World War II to the 1970s?  And what might this tell us 
about corporation law as “a field of intellectual effort” during this era, and 
perhaps our own as well?
14
 
This Article tries to answer that question by examining the structure, 
contexts, and concerns of corporation law—or, to use a term equivalent to 
 
 10.  Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of the Nature of the Firm on the Theory of 
Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 219 (1993) (quoted in Cheffins, supra note 3, at 483 
n.166). 
 11.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law: Filling 
Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 599 (2006). 
 12.  Bratton, supra note 3, at 1471. 
 13.  I recognize that some will disagree with this characterization, but I think it 
describes the prevalent view of corporation law, and even those who challenge it must 
acknowledge its ubiquity. 
 14.  A few scholars have examined this period, notably William Bratton, Gregory 
Mark, and Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, and I have learned much from each. See, e.g., Bratton, 
supra note 3, at 1491–98; Gregory Mark, The Corporate Economy: Ideologies of Regulation 
and Antitrust, 1920-2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 613, 635–44 
(Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins, eds., 2008); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, From 
Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 
30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 195–205 (2005).  I see this Article as expanding on their 
work, especially by linking the corporate law theory they examine with broader intellectual 
movements, outside of corporate law, and with corporate law doctrine of the period. 
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“corporate law as a field of intellectual effort,” corporate law scholarship–
during the “long 1950s” (basically, from the end of World War II to the 
mid-1960s).  It begins with the perhaps necessary presumption that 
corporate law scholarship during this period was not, at least to its 
practitioners, intellectually dead;
15
 indeed, it seeks to show that such 
scholarship engaged some of the era’s leading scholars, who conducted 
significant exchanges with other major intellectuals, whose work was 
published in the nation’s major legal publications and who, apparently, had 
significant readerships.  If corporate law was dead as a field of intellectual 
effort, most corporate law scholars did not know it at the time. 
Corporate law scholarship was also deeply woven into, and influenced 
by, the period’s broader intellectual and political trends.  While it is 
popular to see interdisciplinary scholarship as a recent development in 
law,
16
 corporate law theory during this period reflected scholarly 
developments in related intellectual fields, especially sociology and 
economics.  Indeed, the scholarship discussed here cannot be understood 
apart from a set of underlying assumptions largely borrowed from those 
fields:  that modern American corporations had, through economies of 
scale and scope, come to win permanent oligopolistic positions in many 
industries, thus sharply curbing traditional competition; that large 
corporations were qualitatively different from both their predecessors and 
smaller business units, and wielded not only economic but social and 
political power in ways that other business units did not; that they were not 
merely economic entities but “social institutions” sharing much in common 
with other dominant institutions, notably labor unions; and that the 
consequence of these developments was that corporate management’s role 
had evolved (or was in the process of evolving) so that it should serve not 
only shareholder interests but the competing interests of different corporate 
constituencies, and indeed society as a whole.
17
  It was within this matrix of 
 
 15.  Perhaps it was just “mostly dead.” THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century Fox 
1987). 
 16.  Others know better.  See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT 
ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998) 
(examining the first law and economics movement in the early part of the twentieth 
century); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991) 
(exploring the development of the legal framework for American business enterprise). 
 17.  See, e.g., Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of “Managerialism,” 31 J. BUS. 1, 2 
(1958).  Other legal scholars have noted this line of ideas.  See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1982 (1991); MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 24–28 (1976).  A 
thorough account of the thought of three major managerial thinkers can be found in SCOTT 
R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, 
POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 185–236 (1996). 
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ideas that the era’s corporation law scholarship developed, and even 
opponents of these views found their arguments framed by them.  When the 
intellectual underpinnings of this worldview were abandoned in the 1960s 
and 1970s, so was this strand of corporate law, and shorn of its larger 
context it appears today as peripheral or pointless. 
Corporate law scholarship was also shaped by the politics of the time, 
most significantly the overarching political struggle of the Cold War.  
During these decades few issues were not touched by the political and 
economic competition between communist East and free enterprise West,
18
 
and the corporation was the preeminent representative of the free enterprise 
system.  Thus, study of the corporation found itself implicated in a defense 
of the political-economic system as a whole. 
In this Article, I borrow a phrase from the legal historian Gregory 
Mark and call the set of assumptions that framed such corporate law 
scholarship during the long 1950s “heroic managerialism.”
19
  It’s an 
unwieldy phrase, but serves its purpose.  Just calling these assumptions 
“managerialism” would also be acceptable, at least to historians, but 
modern corporate law scholars use “managerialism” to cover a broader 
array of concepts—basically, any theory of the corporation that presents the 
corporation as a hierarchical entity run by managers with loyalties running 
chiefly to the corporation rather than shareholders, a view that has its 
adherents today.
20
  In contrast, the heroic managerialism I discuss here 
flourished during the decades around 1950 and then largely disappeared, 
and carried an optimism about the role management could play that faded 
and then largely disappeared.  “Corporatism” is another term sometimes 
used to cover a related set of assumptions, but that term also applies to 
more formal governmental-business-labor arrangements that flourished in 
twentieth-century Europe and does not fit the looser and more 
 
 18.  See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2000) (discussing the 
influence of the Cold War on domestic debates over civil rights). 
 19.  Mark, supra note 14, at 642. 
 20.  See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 3, at 1471 (noting that the idea of the firm as a 
“management power structure” was widely accepted in corporate law scholarship until 
1980); Mark S. Mizruchi & Daniel Hirschman, The Modern Corporation as Social 
Construction, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2010) (asserting that the separation of 
ownership and control in the post war era gave managers the ability to accommodate 
government intervention and accept the rights of labor).  That said, “managerialism” was 
used during the 1950s, has been used by scholars since, and seems at least as appropriate as 
any other term.  It probably dates to Burnham’s 1941 classic work MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION.  The earliest usage recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary is from a 1942 
review of Burnham’s book in the American Economic Review. Managerialism Definition, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/245246?redirectedFrom 
=managerialism& (subscription required) (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
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intellectualized vision of mid-century America.
21
 
This Article also aims to make a second contribution by asking why 
high managerial corporate theory did not make more of an impact on 
everyday corporate law.  For all its visibility, corporate law scholarship 
during this era was surprisingly far removed from most of corporate law 
doctrine—the set of established legal rules and procedures regulating 
corporations.  There is, of course, some division between theory and 
practice in almost any area of law, but the divergence between theory and 
doctrine is especially striking here.  Corporate law doctrine did not remain 
completely untouched by developments in what we can see as high legal 
theory, but neither, for all the theorists’ efforts, were the ground rules and 
operating procedures of corporation law significantly reworked by 
theoretical developments; at best one can say that corporate doctrine was 
inflected by the work of the heroic managerial corporate law theorists.  
Why so much talk of change and so little change? 
Finally, in resurrecting a largely forgotten episode in corporate law 
scholarship, this Article may also shed light on perennial issues in 
corporation law.  As more than one scholar has observed, corporation law, 
both doctrine and scholarship, contains within itself divergent views about 
the nature of the corporation.
22
  As William Allen has put it, over the past 
century we have lived with a “schizophrenic conception of the business 
corporation,” in which a property model, which depicts the corporation as 
the property of its shareholders and run for their benefit, has lived uneasily 
alongside a “social” conception, which sees the corporation as an 
institution “tinged with a public purpose.”
23
  In legal scholarship, it is 
 
 21.  Compare William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s 
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 112 
(2008) (“[C]orporatism is not well known in the United States . . . due to its association with 
the fascist politics of the European countries that formally adopted corporatism during the 
1920s and 1930s.”), with Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance 
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.1 (1987) (“[T]he term ‘corporatism’ refers to the 
interaction between a corporation and its various constituencies.”).  
 22.  See Allen, supra note 7, at 264–65 (discussing inconsistent conceptions of the 
corporation); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (2008) (“[I]t is perhaps asking too much to expect us as a people—
or our law—to have a single view of the purpose of an institution so large, pervasive, and 
important as our public corporations.” (quoting Allen, supra note 7, at 280 (1992))); 
Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1087 (2012) (noting that academic theories of the firm do not necessarily correspond with 
judicial conceptions of the firm); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: 
Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
109, 109 (2004) (exploring the “long battle between the conservative, private, shareholder-
wealth-maximization school of corporate legal thought”). 
 23.  Allen, supra note 7, at 264–65. 
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tempting to believe that one side or the other in these debates is finally 
right, and the other wrong, and that the schizophrenia of corporate law will 
end when one side or the other finally comes to its senses.  But this view 
seems to assume that the corporation’s essence and its contexts are fixed, 
and one view or the other must finally be right for all time.  This Article 
suggests another possibility:  that the two approaches wax and wane as the 
corporation and its surrounding political economy change over time.
24
  
Simply put, heroic managerialism may have been an accurate, or at least 
somewhat accurate, view of the corporation and corporate management in 
the 1950s, and it declined when larger social and economic changes 
rendered its assumptions no longer tenable.  The divergent views of the 
corporation contained in corporate law may thus be the products of 
different historical moments, accurate at some times and not others. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I surveys the development of 
recognizably modern corporate law before World War II.  Paying particular 
attention to the 1930s, it shows how corporate law slowly reoriented itself 
from being chiefly concerned with corporate power over groups outside the 
corporation to a newfound focus on the internal relationship between 
shareholders and managers, while also arguing this reorientation was not 
complete even at the end of the 1930s.  Part II sets the stage for discussing 
postwar corporate law by examining postwar American economic 
developments and social thought, demonstrating how a range of 
interconnected developments—including the Cold War, re-found 
prosperity, rapid economic growth, labor-management-government 
accords, and a deliberate rejection of conflict-based theories of politics— 
served to produce a more beneficent vision of the modern corporation and 
especially, modern corporate managers, who now took on the guise of 
“industrial statesmen.”
25
  Part III turns back to corporate law, discussing 
how major strands of corporate legal scholarship shared in these broader 
societal assumptions about the corporation and politics, and why this led 
corporate law scholars to direct their attention to issues that seem, in 
retrospect, puzzling.  Part III continues to then examine the distance that 
existed between heroic managerial corporate law scholarship and what 
could be called mundane corporate law doctrine, and why the theory did 
not significantly change practice—which is one reason the theory seemed 
 
 24.  To be sure, other scholars have recognized that corporate law scholarship is 
determined by larger historical contexts, and that believing there is a single “corporation” to 
be described for all time is wrong.  See, e.g., generally, Bratton, supra note 3, at 1471  
(chronicling the rise of the contractual theory of the firm after 1980); Mark, supra note 14 at 
613 (describing how government involvement in the economy in World War II accelerated 
the growth of the administrative state). 
 25.  Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery 328 (1961). 
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so insubstantial to Manning and later observers, and has left little impact on 
present-day debates.  Part IV essays the decline of heroic managerialism‒
how, as faith in the giant corporation and, especially, the manager-
statesman waned, so did the belief that managers could successfully and 
legitimately balance societal aspirations and govern corporations for the 
common good.  The Article concludes by drawing larger lessons about 
corporate law from this episode. 
I. PRELUDE: THE RISE OF MODERN CORPORATE LAW 
Modern U.S. corporate law took recognizable shape between 1890 and 
1930.
26
  In some form, corporations have existed since before the nation’s 
founding, and by late in the nineteenth century the corporate form was a 
commonplace frame for business organizations, its adoption made easy by 
the passage of general incorporation statutes during the century, and giant 
corporations had become an increasingly common feature of the economic 
landscape, beginning with the railroads.
27
  Even late in the nineteenth 
century, however, the law did not provide incorporators complete freedom.  
Corporation law still retained some of the regulatory function it played 
earlier in the century, and in 1890 forming a corporation meant accepting 
significant state-imposed limitations on business, from size requirements to 
restrictions on corporate purpose.
28
  By 1930, these had largely fallen by 
the wayside, as most states adopted “enabling” statutes that would 
essentially enable incorporators to organize largely as they saw fit.  So, too, 
the purpose of corporate law seemed to shift, and along with it the idea of 
just what a corporation was.  In the previous century, corporate law was 
seen as a way to, among other things, constrain the corporation, a 
presumption tied up with the idea that the corporate franchise meant the 
state had created the corporation.  As the corporate form was a privilege 
given to incorporators, the reasoning went, limits on the corporation were 
the state’s prerogative.  In contrast, the enabling acts characteristic of the 
twentieth century began with the presumption that the corporation was the 
 
 26.  See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 
1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1936) (analyzing the development of corporation law in 
Massachusetts and Illinois over a fifty-year period); Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant 
Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 310–12 (1937) (finding 
that the prevailing trend among states was less regulation and more autonomy for the 
corporation). 
 27.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 390–403 (3d ed. 
2005) (describing the rise of corporation law and large corporations in the mid to late 
nineteenth century). 
 28.  See supra note 26.  This brief account simplifies a complex period in the evolution 
of corporate law. 
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creation of its incorporators, who should be substantially free to organize it 
as they saw fit.
29
 
Undergirding these changes were changes in the way corporations 
impinged on public consciousness.  In the 1890s, Americans vigorously 
debated whether there should be large corporations at all, and if they should 
be allowed to exist, how they were to be prevented from harming 
constituencies, such as communities and small competitors.  By the 1930s, 
Americans had grown more comfortable with the existence of large 
corporations—at least, fewer critics wanted to eliminate them altogether—
and other bodies of law, notably antitrust, had been developed to tame 
corporate power over consumers and small competitors.
30
  And as mass 
shareholding grew in the 1920s, corporate law found a new purpose:  to 
address not corporations’ power over outsiders, but the balance of power 
within the corporation between corporate managers and dispersed, largely 
powerless, shareholders.
31
 
It was a slow and incomplete transition.  While the 1920s saw 
corporate power decline as a central concern in corporate law, it did not 
disappear.  Berle and Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, the foundational work of modern corporate law scholarship, 
demonstrates this.  While much of it dissects power within the corporation, 
particularly the power that non-owner managers had gained over 
shareholders’ property (“the separation of ownership and control”), it also 
touches on the power the corporation wielded over employees, 
communities, and others.  In Berle and Means’ eyes, the nation’s two 
hundred largest corporations were growing in power and size so fast that 
the corporation would soon hold a place as dominant as that of the church 
in medieval Europe.  Given this, it would soon be incumbent on corporate 
managers to run their corporations not merely for shareholders’ benefit. 
Managers, Berle and Means wrote, could be expected to evolve into a 
“purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various 
groups in the community and assigning each a portion of the income stream 
on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.”
32
 
 
 29.  See Rutledge, supra note 26, at 310–12 (finding that state incorporation laws in the 
early twentieth century had moved away from state regulation and towards freedom of 
contract). 
 30.  See Winkler, supra note 22, at 133 (“In the 1920s and 1930s, securities laws and 
collective bargaining laws were adopted to protect the American economy and its workers 
from the corruption of Wall Street.”). 
 31.  JULIA C. OTT, When Wall Street Met Main Street:  The Quest for an Investors’ 
Democracy (2011). 
 32.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 356 (1932).  Note that Berle and Means saw this 
as a future development, not one that the corporation was currently ready for.  A. A. Berle, 
Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). 
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Through the Depression and New Deal, fears of corporate power 
battled with the desire to harness it.  As Ellis Hawley noted in his book The 
New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, New Deal policies concerning 
corporations sometimes attempted to reach the contradictory goals of both 
containing large businesses (through more vigorous enforcement of 
antitrust laws) and harnessing their power (through proposals for large-
scale economic planning and cartelization).
33
  In other words, planners 
couldn’t make up their minds.  The early New Deal saw numerous 
proposals floated for restraining the power and even size of large 
corporations, and some were adopted, such as a progressive corporate 
income tax.
34
  Though proposals for energetic government involvement in 
business faded by the end of the New Deal, as Keynesian spending won 
favor as the chief tool of economic management,
35
 proposals to tame or 
break up corporations still gained traction.  As late as 1937, Congress held 
hearings on a bill for federal licensing of corporations as a way to protect 
not only shareholders, but labor, consumers, and small competitors of the 
giant corporations.
36
  And at the end of the decade, Roosevelt launched the 
investigations of the Temporary National Economic Commission (TNEC), 
charged with producing a “thorough study of the concentration of 
economic power” in America, though the subsequent hearings and report 
were equivocal and, as Alan Brinkley has noted, lacked the “populist 
resentment of corporate power” one might have expected.
37
 
However limited all these steps were in practice—none significantly 
shrunk the size of giant businesses or greatly curbed their power—they 
demonstrate that corporate power was still a major concern in the 1930s, 
and that corporation law had not completely ceded concern with that power 
to other subfields.  Corporate power would still be an issue after the war, 
but in very different forms. 
 
 33.  See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF 
MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966). 
 34.  STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT (2010). 
 35.  Hawley, supra note 33, at 485; see also ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: 
NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 123–32 (1995) (describing how the TNEC 
investigations aided the shift towards Keynesian economic policy). 
 36.  Federal Licensing of Corporations: Hearing on S. 10 Before a Subcomm. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 2 (1937). 
 37.  BRINKLEY, supra note 35, at 123–32; HAWLEY, supra note 33, at 412. 
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II. POSTWAR POLITICAL ECONOMY 
A. The Long 1950s:  Economics, Ideology, and the Cold War 
After World War II, both the American economy, and the ways 
Americans thought and talked about it, changed sharply.  In retrospect, the 
period from the end of the war to the late 1960s seems an economic golden 
age.
38
 The basic facts are well-known.  While the 1930s marked the 
economy’s low point, World War II revived it.  Wartime government 
spending boosted production, while industry’s vital role in the war effort 
helped rehabilitate the image of corporations tarred with the economic 
failures of the previous decades.
39
  At war’s end, a feared recession did not 
materialize, and instead pent-up consumer demand ignited economic 
growth.  Between 1945 and 1973, real per capita income doubled,
40
 and to a 
great extent this new wealth was spread widely, as wage inequality fell 
sharply in the 1940s and did not begin to increase significantly again until 
the 1970s.
41
 
At the center of this economic success story was the American 
corporation, more specifically the few hundred giant corporations 
perceived as dominating most major industries.
42
  Analyses of the 
American economy often began with the vision of a corporation-centered 
economy offered in The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  Based 
on data assembled by Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property had made two big claims about the American economy:  that 
 
 38.  A Golden Age appears only in retrospect, and of course in many ways the 1950s 
were deeply imperfect, but the economic growth and dispersion of wealth in this period has 
not been matched since. 
 39.  See LOUIS GALAMBOS & JOSEPH PRATT, THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE 
COMMONWEALTH 127–29 (1988) (stating that World War II began the reconciliation process 
between corporations and American society); ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE 
CORPORATE SOUL 312–56 (2001) (detailing the attempts of large corporations during the 
second world war to improve their public image by tying their operations to the war effort). 
 40.  WYATT WELLS, AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1945-2000: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
FROM MASS PRODUCTIONTO THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 27–28 (2004). 
 41.  See Claudia Goldin & Robert A. Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage 
Structure in the United States at Mid-Century, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1, 3 (1992) (outlining the 
decrease in wage inequality in the 1940s and its subsequent reversal in the 1970s). 
 42.  “Perceived” because, as Alfred Chandler pointed out long ago, concentration came 
in some industries but not in others, a fact overlooked by many critics of the American 
economy.  See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Structure of American Industry in the Twentieth 
Century: A Historical Overview, 43 BUS. HIS. REV. 255, 255 (1969) (noting the failure of 
many economists to emphasize the lack of uniformity in corporate concentration across 
industries).  As used here, “corporation” generally applies to the large, public corporations 
perceived as economically and politically dominant. 
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control of corporations was shifting from stockholders to managers,
43
 and 
that more and more of the nation’s wealth was gravitating to approximately 
two hundred of the nation’s largest corporations, which no longer engaged 
in fierce competition but existed in a comfortable oligopoly.  In 1932, Berle 
and Means had estimated that those corporations controlled half the 
nation’s corporate wealth.
44
  In the postwar era, both assertions were still 
alive,
45
 though Berle and Means retreated a bit from their claim that 
corporations were accruing larger percentages of national wealth.
46
  In 
particular, the belief that competition was weakening, a longheld belief of 
antitrust advocates, became the conventional wisdom.  The era of laissez-
faire, it was said, was past, and the time where industries contained many 
small manufacturers battling for market share had been succeeded by one 
where more and more industries were controlled by a small number of 
dominant corporations locked in oligopolistic competition.  This in turn 
gave those firms greater ability to set prices higher than they would have in 
perfect competition, leading some to speak of the postwar shift “from 
competitive to administered prices.”
47
  Indeed, economic pressures on giant 
corporations weakened along other dimensions as well; they also appeared 
insulated from demands of the capital markets, as internally generated 
funding came to replace the securities markets as a prime supplier of 
 
 43.  More precisely, the claim was that control of corporations was shifting to whatever 
group had the power to name the board of directors.  But for many readers, that equated to 
the company’s senior managers. 
 44.  This excludes business wealth controlled by banks.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, 
at 32. 
 45.  See, e.g., Robert J. Larner, Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial 
Corporations, 1929 and 1963, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1966) (explaining the general 
acceptance of Berle and Means’ thesis in the literature); Clair Wilcox, On the Alleged 
Ubiquity of Oligopoly, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 67, 67 (1950) (analyzing studies that measured 
the accumulation of wealth by corporations in the post-war era).  This is not to say there 
were no dissenters, just that their basic conclusions were generally accepted. 
 46.  ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); John 
Lintner, The Financing of Corporations, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 170–71 
(Edward S. Mason, ed., 1960). 
 47.  W. T. Easterbrook, Book Review, 67 J. POL. EC. 425, 425 (1959) (reviewing 
THOMAS COCHRAN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS SYSTEM (1957)).  On “administered prices,” 
see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER 196–200 (1952) (comparing the risk of inflation in a competitive 
market with a market in which government influences demand); GARDINER C. MEANS, 
PRICING POWER & THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A STUDY BASED ON STEEL (1962) (arguing that the 
government should administer prices by altering the tax incentives of large businesses).  The 
late 1950s did see Congressional hearings on administered prices.  See Meg Jacobs, 
“Pocketbook Politics”, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 250, 267 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds. 
2003) (outlining Senate investigations between 1957 and 1963 into pricing practices by 
large businesses). 
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investment capital.
48
 
In retrospect, there was good reason to think the economy had 
fundamentally changed.  According to the economic historian Louis 
Galambos, “[i]n most sectors of the American economy . . . oligopoly 
prevailed and with it, competitive practices that downplayed short-term 
price competition and emphasized competition through product and process 
innovation and through new forms of marketing.”
49
  As Alfred Chandler 
showed, many of the corporations that grew to industrial dominance by the 
1910s held their commanding positions into the 1970s, which suggested 
that competition was not alive and well in the upper reaches of the 
economy.
50
  Defense spending effectively sponsored many industries, 
which operated less in an environment of fierce competition than as part of 
an “administered economy,” with steady profits guaranteed by cost-plus 
contracts.
51
  Other industries, including railroads, airlines, finance, and 
energy production, were so heavily regulated that competition there, too, 
was muted at best.
52
 
Given the decline of competition, and the apparent entrenchment of 
the largest firms, one might have thought that corporate power would 
return as a major public issue.  There were, certainly, some limits on 
corporations; regulated industries were, after all, regulated.  Postwar 
administrations did not, however, appear eager to impose further limits on 
giant corporations, at least not the draconian limits sometimes envisioned 
in the New Deal.  A memorable sign of business’s new eminence came 
during the confirmation hearings of Eisenhower’s nominee for Secretary of 
 
 48.  BERLE, supra note 46, at 25–40.  This view was widespread, but was not universal.  
See, e.g., Lintner, supra note 46, at 166 (discussing the internal financing of corporations in 
the period).  For more on capital markets at mid-century, see Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. 
Bank & Harwell Wells, Questioning “Law and Finance”: U.S. Stock Market Development, 
1930-1970, 55 BUS. HIST. ___ (forthcoming 2013) (examining corporate law’s protection of 
shareholders and the effect of that protection on capital markets during the period of 1930 to 
1970). 
 49.  Louis Galambos, The U.S. Corporate Economy in the Twentieth Century, in 3 THE 
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 927, 942 (2008).  In other industrial 
sectors characterized by batch production and customized products, such oligopolies did not 
arise.  See id. at 938. 
 50.  This was also the view at the time; one 1958 study of the one hundred largest firms 
indicated that the movement of firms out of the “top 100,” and particularly out of the top of 
the “top 100,” was decreasing over time, and that there was “considerable reason to believe 
that firms now at the top of the industrial pyramid are more likely to remain there . . . [and] 
large-scale corporations enjoy an increasing amount of entrenchment of position by virtue of 
their size.”  Norman R. Collins & Lee E. Preston, The Size Structure of the Largest 
Industrial Firms, 1909-1958, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 986, 1001 (1961) (emphasis omitted). 
 51.  GALAMBOS & PRATT, supra note 39, at 137. 
 52.  See id. at 153–54 (describing the cross-industry regulatory initiatives from 1940 to 
1969). 
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Defense, General Motors President Charles Wilson, who told Congress that 
“for years I thought what was good for our country was good for General 
Motors and vice versa.”
53
  The antitrust laws were strengthened a bit in 
1950, and their enforcement did prevent some horizontal and vertical 
mergers in some industries, but they did not challenge industry 
concentrations as a whole.
54
 
So the fear of corporate power so widespread in the 1930s did not 
return after the war.  Indeed, the postwar era presents a paradox:  Even as 
corporations were perceived as more powerful than ever, fears of their 
power receded and changed, while not completely disappearing.  Part of the 
explanation for this lies in the success of business and government in 
World War II—the war “generally softened Americans’ historically 
suspicious attitudes toward large[-scale] organizations and their 
management.”
55
  But it is also to be found in new understandings of 
American politics that flourished after the war, understandings that 
depicted American society as characterized not by conflict but consensus, 
and that saw corporations as only one of several competing powers jostling 
for space at the commanding heights of American politics. 
During the Great Depression American society was riven by, and was 
perceived as riven by, fundamental disagreements.
56
  The 1930s’ 
sometimes violent conflicts, particularly battles between labor and 
management over unionization, as well as the “vitriolic rhetoric” deployed 
by different interest groups, reinforced the vision of a deeply divided 
nation.  As the decade drew to a close, however, both foreign and domestic 
influences discouraged class-based hostility and vituperative political 
discourse.
57
  The rise of fascist governments abroad, and their persecution 
of minorities, led to public campaigns that emphasized Americans’ 
common traditions and commitments.  These campaigns were particularly 
encouraged by business interests, as organizations such as the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) sought to convince Americans that, 
 
 53.  MORRELL HEALD, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS: COMPANY AND 
COMMUNITY, 1900-1960, 276 n.8 (1970) (quoting Excerpts From Two Wilson Hearings 
Before Senate Committees on Defense Appointment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1953, at 8). 
 54.  See TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA 1880-1990, 300–04 (1992) (describing the antitrust laws of the 1950s and their 
policies); GALAMBOS & PRATT, supra note 39. 
 55.  RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 200 (2007). 
 56.  This paragraph draws heavily on Wendy L. Wall, INVENTING THE “AMERICAN 
WAY”: THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUS FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
(2008). 
 57.  Id. 
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contra the widespread impression left in the 1930s, industrialists’ interests 
were not so different from those of ordinary people.  Once World War II 
began, groups on “both ends of the political spectrum”
58
 had further reason 
to adopt rhetorical strategies that emphasized commonalities over 
disagreements, as they sought to distinguish the United States from its 
enemies and avoid accusations they were impeding the war effort.  After 
the war, the pressures of the Cold War further encouraged a measure of 
ideological uniformity; it was not that different American political groups 
abandoned all disagreement, so much that they came to see the essence of 
the American system as pragmatic compromise between different interest 
groups sharing fundamental assumptions.  Alongside popular visions of 
harmony appeared intellectual approaches that depicted America as 
blessedly free of the deep social and ideological antagonisms that 
characterized other nations.  A “decentralized, non-ideological, interest-
group theory of politics”
59
 was attractive as an American way of 
repudiating pre-war Europe’s ideological polarization.  It was in this 
climate that the “consensus” school of American history flourished, and 
such prominent public intellectuals as Daniel Boorstin, Richard Hofstadter, 
Louis Hartz, and Lionel Trilling could assert that America, far from being a 
battleground of competing ideologies, had essentially a single belief system 
since the Founding:  classical liberalism.
60
 
American politics were also depicted as rooted in broad societal 
consensus.  While conflict was not absent from the dominant “pluralist” 
school of American politics, political scientists depicted the nation’s 
political competitions as the largely beneficent contest between well-
organized interest groups, with none predominating.  As Daniel Rodgers 
has pointed out, the touchstone of this approach, Robert Dahl’s Who 
Governs?, depicted local politics in New Haven as composed of so many 
competing social and economic groups that “no single interest or 
interlocking set of interests, no power elite or ruling class, was capable of 
monopolizing it all.”
61
  This summary nicely captures the pluralists’ vision 
of national politics as well. 
At the national level, this produced a vision of the politics of 
 
 58.  Id. at 105. 
 59.  See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN 
LABOR 150 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002) (analyzing political trends in America after World 
War II). 
 60.  See KEVIN MATTSON, INTELLECTUALS IN ACTION: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW LEFT 
AND RADICAL LIBERALISM, 1945-1970 65, 182, and passim (2002) (describing the views of 
various New York intellectuals and writers on the ideology of American political thought in 
the 1950s).  This consensus did not survive the 1960s. 
 61.  DANIEL RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 82 (2011). 
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“countervailing power,” as John Kenneth Galbraith dubbed it.
62
  This 
power came into play particularly to tame the power of large corporations.  
Whereas earlier in the century political struggle had often been seen as a 
battle between the people and the interests, with “the interests” usually 
meaning big business, the dominant postwar account of economic politics, 
and of business’ role in it, was far less threatening.  American politics were 
no longer, Galbraith and others argued, dominated by big corporations (if 
they ever had been)—they had been joined by other large organized interest 
groups, most visibly big labor and big government (and, in some versions, 
still others, such as giant foundations or organized retailers).
63
  Galbraith’s 
American Capitalism argued that, in postwar America, corporations were 
now merely one of a number of jockeying interest groups, their power 
offset not by direct competition with rivals but by the “countervailing 
power” of other large institutions, ranging from other large corporations 
(for instance, retail chains countering producers) to unions, which served to 
mobilize the economic power of otherwise powerless individuals and small 
groups.
64
  While Galbraith’s account was cast in the language of 
economics, it was clear that he believed countervailing powers also served 
to limit the political power of corporations.  As one scholar puts it, 
Galbraith’s analysis not only confirmed that contemporary American 
democracy was dominated by powerful social and economic groups rather 
than by an omnipotent state or a large number of free individuals, it also 
implied that the state of affairs was “not nearly so dangerous as often 
supposed.”
65
  Countervailing powers, and America’s presumed competitive 
public sphere, contrasted sharply with the totalitarianism against which the 
nation struggled. 
Unions (or “Big Labor”) deserve special comment.  Before passage of 
the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, workers’ right to form unions 
was often challenged and unions themselves struggled to win legitimacy.  
The late 1930s saw an enormous rise in union membership, and many firms 
that had long held out against unionization were forced to allow it, but this 
 
 62.  GALBRAITH, supra note 47. 
 63.  See RODGERS, supra note 61, at 80–81 (“The dominant reading of power in mid-
twentieth century America has been interest-group pluralism. On the fields of economy and 
politics, it was said, the best organized social interests competed ceaselessly for influence.”) 
 64.  GALBRAITH, supra note 47, at 108–134; see also RICHARD PARKER, JOHN KENNETH 
GALBRAITH: HIS LIFE, HIS POLITICS, HIS ECONOMICS (2008) (a biography of Galbraith which 
describes his views on countervailing power). 
 65.  Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Corporate Power: Government by Private Groups, and 
the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 171 (1957); see also Nelson Lichtenstein, AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM: SOCIAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 
(Nelson Lichtenstein, ed., 2006) (at mid-century “most theorists worried far more about a 
claustrophobic bureaucratism than an uncontrolled market capitalism”). 
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did not necessarily augur a truce between labor and management.  As soon 
as the war ended, significant labor conflict broke across the nation, and the 
late 1940s often saw bitter strikes.
66
  By the end of that decade, though, the 
endemic struggle between capital and labor was replaced, at least in the 
public eye, by a labor-management concordat in which corporate managers 
were left to run their businesses as they saw fit, and, in return, labor unions 
received income and benefits sufficient to carry their members into the 
middle class.  The exemplar of this new industrial harmony was the 
UAW’s 1950 agreement with the Big Three automakers, which guaranteed 
union workers “pensions, health insurance, the union shop, and a 20 
percent increase in the standard of living,” an agreement now remembered 
as the “Treaty of Detroit.”
67
  While no one would deny corporations had 
considerable power in society, it was believed to be power held in check. 
These economic and intellectual developments, helped along no doubt 
by pro-business advertising campaigns, produced a new vision of the 
American corporation in the postwar era.  No longer, many argued, was the 
corporation merely an economic entity, it had become a “social 
institution.”
68
  What exactly this meant can be hard to pin down.  Berle and 
Means described the corporation as a “major social institution” in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, claiming that the corporation 
(by which they meant the 200 largest American corporations) had accrued 
so much economic power, at the same time ownership of the corporation 
had become so attenuated, that the “larger interests of society” now had a 
claim on corporate wealth at least equal to that of shareholders.
69
  They also 
speculated that the corporation’s power meant it might eclipse even the 
state as the dominant institution of modern society.
70
  Postwar, these views 
were a little more muted—the countervailing powers theory described the 
corporation as being countered by other power blocks such as Big Labor—
but there was still a sense that the largest corporations, by virtue of their 
size, stability, and economic influence, had taken on a new social role, and 
corporate management a new social responsibility. 
It is tempting, particularly for a corporate law scholar, to find the 
intellectual roots of this view in Berle & Means (or just Berle, who was still 
 
 66.  LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 59, at 103–04.  As Lichtenstein notes, what we 
remember as a relatively harmonious labor compact in the 1950s was not perceived as that 
by labor at the time.  LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 59, at 99 (“During the first two decades after 
World War II few unionists could have been found to declare their relationship with 
corporate America particularly agreeable or stable.”). 
 67.  LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 59, at 123. 
 68.  LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 59, at 351. 
 69.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 351, 356. 
 70.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 351, 356. 
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active in the 1950s).
71
  That act of compression, though, would 
misrepresent the complex origins and widespread acceptance of the 
managerial worldview that gave managers a broader, some would say 
iconic, social role.  As early as 1914 Walter Lippmann had prophesied in 
Drift and Mastery, that the separation of ownership and control would turn 
workaday managers into “industrial statesmen,” managing corporations in 
the broader social interest.
72
  In the 1920s corporate leaders such as Owen 
Young of GE had insisted on the corporation’s larger social role and 
instituted programs of welfare capitalism for workers.
73
  In 1940 James 
Burnham had published his enormously influential The Managerial 
Revolution, where he drew on Berle & Means, among others, to argue that 
a “social revolution” was underway that would see “an unusually rapid rate 
of change [in] the most important economic, social, political, and cultural 
institutions of society,” and that would conclude with a new, managerial 
class seizing control of the major institutions of society.
74
  In 1946, Peter 
Drucker, whose position as a major social theorist was only later eclipsed 
by his role as pop-management guru, described his study of General 
Motors, The Concept of the Corporation, as taking a “social and political 
approach to the problems of industrial society—as distinct from 
economics.”
75
  In the postwar United States, he wrote, “[o]nly now have we 
realized that the large mass-production plant is our social reality, our 
representative institution, which has to carry the burden of our dreams.”
76
  
And this new view of the corporation and its management was not limited 
to social theorists; managerialist conceptions came to dominate business 
education in the 1950s, and even the Harvard Business School made room 
for “a certain notion of stewardship on [its] definition of the manager’s 
 
 71.  For a thought-provoking reconsideration of Berle’s later works, see Marc T. Moore 
& Antoine Rebérioux, Corporate Power in the Public Eye: Reassessing the Implications of 
Berle’s Public Consensus Theory, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1109 (2010). 
 72.  See William Leuchtenberg, Walter Lippmann’s ‘Drift and Mastery,’ in WALTER 
LIPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 8–9 (1961) (positing that a bright future rested in replacing 
business leaders driven by the profit motive with industrial statesmen who put societal 
interests first). 
 73.  MARY O’SULLIVAN, CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 85 (2001). 
 74.  JAMES BURNHAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 71–77 and passim (1940).  
Burnham had been influenced by Berle and Means.  See DANIEL KELLY, JAMES BURNHAM 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD 93 (2002).  In important respects, it should be noted, 
Burnham’s vision was sui generis; he also believed that one consequence of the managerial 
revolution would be state ownership of the means of production. 
 75.  PETER DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION xxvi (1946).  Drucker certainly 
did not agree with Burnham or the other “managerial” authors on everything; for instance, 
he believed the corporation had to be guided by the profit motive. 
 76.  Id. at 142. 
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role.”
77
 
This different vision of the corporation also meant a different vision of 
corporate power.  As noted, it is not that corporate power disappeared from 
the agenda; Galbraith, for instance, believed corporate power had been 
tamed but certainly had not completely disappeared.  Rather, as the 
corporation increasingly was seen as a social institution, increasing concern 
was paid to its social, and not merely economic, power.  In 1957, the 
Harvard economist Carl Kaysen published an essay in the American 
Economics Review entitled The Social Significance of the Modern 
Corporation that opened by claiming that in “the evolving giant 
corporation, managers possess great scope for decision making 
unconstrained by market forces . . . .”
78
  Such unconstrained power could 
be dangerous, and not just for economic reasons; “the modern corporation,” 
he continued, “operates to spread business valuations and business ideas 
widely through the whole of society . . . most obviously through the mass 
media, the tone of which is set by the themes of sales promotions.  But the 
more subtle effect of membership in the corporate institution is probably 
more important.”
79
  Modern corporations had almost guaranteed workers 
and executives permanent employment, but this meant that “membership in 
the modern corporation becomes the single strongest social force shaping 
its career members in the whole hierarchy above the production line.”
80
  
Harvard law professor Abram Chayes wrote shortly thereafter that the 
corporation was: 
the dominant nongovernmental institution of American life.  The 
university, the labor union, the church, the charitable  foundation, 
the professional association—other potential institutional 
centers—are all, in comparison, both peripheral and derivative.
81
 
Making the point about the corporation as a “social institution” more 
explicit, a 1959 collection of essays on the corporation (including Chayes’), 
most written by law professors and economists, was not entitled, say, the 
Corporation and the Economy but The Corporation in Modern Society.
82
 
 
 77.  KHURANA, supra note 55, at 291. 
 78.  Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. 
REV. 311, 316 (1957). 
 79.  Id. at 318. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Abram Chayes, The Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 27 
(Edward S. Mason, ed., 1959).  An interesting comment, as it suggests that Chayes was not 
fully won over by the countervailing power thesis. 
 82.  THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (Edward S. Mason, ed., 1959).  Out of 
fourteen contributors, three were law professors, six economists or business-school 
professors, two political scientists, and one sociologist. 
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The concept of the corporation as a major social institution, with 
consequent social power, had at least two further effects.  First, it created 
some affinities between “managerial” writers such as Berle, Drucker, and 
Kaysen, and more popular critics of the corporation such as the journalist 
Vance Packard, author of an attack on advertisers, The Hidden Persuaders, 
or William Whyte, who wrote the classic critique of corporate conformism, 
The Organization Man—each of whom focused their fire on the subtle 
ways that corporations could affect society.  In the above essay, for 
instance, Harvard economist Kaysen does not sound so far from Packard. 
Second, the emphasis on the corporation as a social institution led 
some observers to blur the specific economic and legal nature of the 
corporation.  Once the (dominant, large, public) corporation was perceived 
as a significant social institution, it was often categorized and analyzed 
along with other giant social institutions such as unions, the multiversity, or 
the emerging giant foundations, losing some of its distinctiveness in the 
process.  American society, in this view, became a network of large 
institutions, with the corporation as the most prominent, tied together atop a 
society and economy they managed.  Galbraith, for instance, would count 
unions as one of the “countervailing powers” scrutinized in American 
Capitalism.
83
  Speaking further from the left, the radical sociologist C. 
Wright Mills in his classic, The Power Elite—admittedly a more 
thoroughgoing critic of corporations than most discussed in this Article—
depicted the corporation, which he saw as controlling the “economic 
domain” of modern society, as only one of society’s “big three” 
hierarchies, alongside the state and the military, and further argued that all 
were deeply entwined:  “[t]here is no longer, on the one hand, an economy, 
and, on the other hand, a political order containing a military establishment 
unimportant in politics and money-making.  There is a political economy 
linked in a thousand ways, with military institutions and decisions.”
84
  Even 
Bayless Manning, when criticizing studies of “corporate power” published 
in the 1950s, argued that the problem under consideration was not the 
power of the “generic” corporation – which was merely a legal form – but 
 
 83.  See GALBRAITH, supra note 47, at 196–200 (describing the power of unions to 
influence markets by seeking and obtaining increases in prices or wages).  Note that 
Galbraith was by no means equating the two, just noting that through certain analytic lenses, 
they played much the same role. 
 84.  C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 7-8 (1956).  Mills deserves mention here, but 
he was an outlier in managerialism, taking a far more pessimistic view of the development 
of a managerial class than did the other thinkers discussed here. He is probably more 
usefully classified with critics of bureaucratic society from the right (James Burnham) or the 
left (the Frankfurt School).  See Howard Brick, The Postcapitalist Vision in Twentieth-
Century American Thought, in AMERICAN CAPITALISM 26 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006) 
(exploring Mills’ critical views on “new order of politically regulated markets”). 
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rather the power wielded in modern America by any “vast centralized 
economic and social organization,” including giant corporations.
85
  Looking 
back, the historian Richard Pells would write of the view of the 
“harmonious marriage of government, business, the military, and the 
unions that became an accustomed feature of American life after 1945.”
86
 
Berle and Means, Drucker, Kaysen, and Manning did not speak for 
everyone, nor did they agree on every point, but their comments do mark 
out a distinctive approach in economic and social thought that influenced 
how the corporation was understood during the long 1950s.  Moving 
towards the main subject of this Article, we can ask how this broad view 
shaped understandings of corporate management, and how this in turn 
shaped legal scholarship on the corporation. 
B. Heroic Managerialism 
At the core of mid-century managerialism was not only the belief that 
large corporations were rapidly developing into, or already were, dominant 
economic and social institutions, but that they were being run by a new 
kind of controller.  Both those optimistic and pessimistic about 
managerialism pointed to corporate managers as a central element of the 
new system, individuals who were responsible no longer for shareholders 
alone, but for other constituencies and, indeed, society at large.  As the 
historian Charles Maier observed, “[w]ith the participation of the 
businessman in a fabric of social responsibility and national policy making, 
management ideology claimed a new inclusiveness.  No longer could the 
managerial function be conceived of in terms of the firm alone.  In the era 
of the Cold War it involved a national mission . . . .”
87
 
To critics, the managers’ new role signaled the rise of a new ruling 
class; Burnham and C. Wright Mills, for instance, saw corporate managers 
as helping constitute a new ruling class, supplanting the proprietor-
capitalists of a previous era. 
More sympathetic students of the corporation did not see senior 
managers in such a sinister light, but they agreed that managers’ roles had 
fundamentally changed.  Managers, they believed, were no longer merely 
agents of their shareholders.  Berle and Means had said something similar 
in 1932,
88
 but the idea became widespread in the postwar era, as corporate 
 
 85.  Bayless Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom, 55 NW. L. REV. 38, 
40 (1960). 
 86.  RICHARD PELLS, THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 55 (1985). 
 87.  Charles Maier, Society as Factory, in IN SEARCH OF STABILITY 66 (1988). 
 88.  They foresaw management becoming a “neutral technocracy” in 1932; this does 
not mean they though management as it actually existed in 1932 had yet achieved this.  See 
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leaders were increasingly depicted as taking responsibility to multiple 
constituencies, at minimum labor and consumers as well as shareholders 
and, in a more expansive view of their role, to society generally.
89
  In 1950, 
Drucker wrote of the need for a business enterprise to have “management 
whose responsibility is to the enterprise rather than to any one group:  
owners, workers, or consumers,”
90
 and a decade later Berle, who remained 
a formidable intellectual presence through the 1950s, did him one better by 
speaking of modern directors who were no longer “limited to running 
business enterprises for maximum profit, but are in fact . . . administrators 
of a community system.”
91
  Economists voiced similar beliefs; in his 1957 
essay, Kaysen wrote that management, no longer constrained by fierce 
competition or the need for outside capital, “sees itself as responsible to 
stockholders, employees, customers, the general public, and, perhaps most 
important, the firm itself as an institution,”
92
 while his Harvard colleague, 
Edward S. Mason, wrote shortly thereafter of “managerial voices . . . raised 
to deny th[e] exclusive preoccupation with profits and to assert that 
corporate managements are really concerned with equitable sharing of 
corporate gains among owners, workers, suppliers, and customers.”
93
 
The last comment is slightly jarring, for it hints that this 
managerialism was the ideology not only of the managerial theorists, but of 
corporate managers themselves.  The evidence suggests that this is the 
case—or at least that in their public pronouncements, corporate leaders 
believed they had taken on new responsibilities to corporate constituencies 
and the broader society.
94
  Clearly, many business leaders accepted some or 
all of the economic underpinnings of managerialism; by the 1950s, for 
instance, many senior managers had concluded that pure competition was 
in the past, and that the kind of competition facing large corporations was 
 
C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 89–90 (2002) 
(highlighting Berle-Dodd debate regarding the role and powers of directors and managers). 
 89.  See id. at 100–10 (2002), for a survey of this development. 
 90.  PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 40 (1950). 
 91.  Adolf A. Berle, Foreward, in THE CORPORATION AND MODERN SOCIETY XII 
(Edward S. Mason, ed., 1959). 
 92.  Kaysen, supra note 78, at 313. 
 93.  Edward S. Mason, Introduction, in THE CORPORATION AND MODERN SOCIETY 11 
(Edward S. Mason, ed., 1959); see also Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of 
‘Managerialism,” 31 J. BUS. 1, 3 (1958) (noting that management must “‘conduct the affairs 
of the enterprise in such a way as to maintain an equitable and working balance among the 
claims of the various directly interested groups—stockholders, employees, customers, and 
the public at large.’” (quoting J.K. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF 
COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952))). 
 94.  The sources discussed in this paragraph and the next examine the public statements 
of businessmen; their private beliefs are more difficult to plumb. 
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imperfect or oligopolistic competition, not the competition of:  
“a peddler with a pack of pots and pans on his back and a 
different price to every customer [but] . . . the competition of 
pricing policies, of quality, of consumer surveys, of mass 
advertising and of mass distribution devices, of research, and of 
production practices and conditions of employment.”
95
  Nor did 
many object to the notion that prices were “administered,” only 
to the “implication that administered prices were arbitrary, 
sinister, evil, and anti-social.”
96
 
Managers seemed to welcome this new public role.  In 1948, the 
Harvard Business School’s alumni association announced that “[t]oday 
most managements operate as trustee in recognition of the claims of 
employees, investors, consumers, and government.”
97
  In 1951, Fortune 
magazine announced in a special survey of the American economy that the 
United States had produced a new “kind of capitalism that neither Karl 
Marx nor Adam Smith ever dreamed of.”
98
  Quoting Standard Oil of New 
Jersey President Frank Abrams, it reported that managers were increasingly 
conducting the “affairs of the enterprise in such a way as to maintain an 
equitable and working balance among the claims of the various directly 
interested groups—stockholders, employees, customers, and the public at 
large.”
99
  Expanding on this, the magazine’s editors insisted that 
“[m]anagement is no longer occupied exclusively with the interests of the 
stockholder, who often has become a kind of contingent bondholder rather 
than a part owner, and who rarely exerts any direct influence on the affairs 
of the company.”
100
 
This view was echoed several years later in a large-scale sociological 
study of the public ideology of American business, The American Business 
Creed.
101
  Drawing on the public statements of business leaders, 
spokesmen, and organizations, its authors identified a “managerial” view as 
 
 95.  HERMAN E. KROOSS, EXECUTIVE OPINION: WHAT BUSINESS LEADERS SAID AND 
THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, 1920’S-1960’S 311 (1970) (quoting U.S. Steel Chairman 
Roger Blough). 
 96.  Id. at 327. 
 97.  Maier, supra note 87, at 66. 
 98.  THE EDITORS OF FORTUNE MAGAZINE, U.S.A. THE PERMANENT REVOLUTION 68 
(1951).  The chapters in this book originally appeared in a special issue of Fortune 
magazine. 
 99.  Id. at 80. 
 100.  Id.  It did continue, however, that management could also not “flagrantly disregard 
stockholders’ interests.”  Id. 
 101.  The authors were clear to note that theirs was a study of ideology, the “system of 
beliefs publicly expressed with the manifest purpose of influencing the sentiments and 
actions of others.”  FRANCIS X. SUTTON ET AL., THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CREED 2 (1962). 
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one of the two major strands of business ideology (the other being a 
“classical” strand).
102
  The managerial view emphasized “the role of 
professional managers in the large business firm who consciously 
direct[ed] economic forces for the common good.”
103
  This was, its 
adherents believed, a new form of American capitalism, one born as “the 
whole system is moving toward a new kind of homogeneity—of large, 
professionally managed, socially oriented corporations” (note again 
responsibilities not merely to other corporate constituencies but society or 
the “common good”).
104
  As described by the study’s authors, this view 
held by businessmen could easily have been shared by Berle or Drucker: 
[T]he enterprise is not conceived in the narrow terms of its 
legal model.  Instead emphasis is placed on the enterprise 
as a social system.  Employees, customers, and suppliers 
are not regarded as outsiders but as integral parts of the 
organization; their relations to management are not purely, 
or even mainly, contractual and economic. . . . [I]n the 
managerial view [stockholders] are on a par with other 
groups that have stakes in, and just claims on, the 
organization.  Managers are assigned a more important and 
more autonomous role than that of agents for the owners.  
Theirs is the statesman’s function of mediating among the 
groups dependent on the enterprise, satisfying just claims 
and preserving the continuity of the organization.
105
 
In the authors’ analysis, deeply suffused with the sociological views of the 
time, the managerial ideology was a response to managers’ discomfort with 
the implied selfishness of businessmen, as it denied “that private profit is or 
ought to be the principal orientation of the business enterprise.”
106
  A nice 
summary of this public creed was provided by General Foods President 
Clarence Francis, who told a Congressional committee in 1949 of his  
“three-way responsibility to the American consumer, to our 
associates in this business, and to the 68,000 men and women 
whose faith has been shown by their investment in General 
 
 102.  Id. at 34.  The “classical” strand centered around the “model of a decentralized, 
private, competitive capitalism, in which the forces of supply and demand, operating 
through the price mechanism, regulate the economy in detail and in aggregate.”  Id. at 33.  
The classical strand would undergo a resurgence in the 1970s, and it seems fair to claim it is 
dominant today. 
 103.  See id. at 34. 
 104.  Id. at 36. 
 105.  Id. at 57–58. 
 106.  Id. at 357. 
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Foods.  We . . . would serve (the company’s) interests badly by 
shifting the fruits of the enterprise too heavily toward any one of 
those groups.”
107
 
The ubiquity of heroic managerial assumptions was displayed as well 
in the renewed popularity of “social responsibility” during this era.
108
  Few 
businessmen failed to at least give a nod to the concept during the 1950s, 
and by 1959, so popular was it that the business writer Theodore Levitt 
launched an assault on the concept in the Harvard Business Review, writing 
that the movement had left “the profit motive . . . compromised in both 
word and deed. . . . Today’s profits must be merely adequate, not 
maximum.”  It was, he continued, “not fashionable for the corporation to 
take gleeful pride in making money. . . . [it was] fashionable . . . for the 
corporation to show that it is a great innovator; more specifically, a great 
public benefactor; and, very particularly, that it exists ‘to serve the 
public.’”
109
 
Some skepticism is, of course, due these statements, designed as they 
were for public consumption.  The persona of the “corporate statesman” 
was, in part, the deliberate creation of publicists for business interests, who 
sought to challenge 1930s images of business leaders as either malevolent 
or incompetent.
110
  After World War II, both the National Association of 
Manufacturers and the Advertising Council launched publicity campaigns 
that told consumers that, since the Depression, corporate leaders had “seen 
the light and were now among the most civic-minded and responsible of 
American citizens.”
111
  Looking back, there is also little evidence to support 
a claim that managers of large public corporations in the 1950s actually 
governed their firms for the benefit of multiple constituencies or cared less 
about profits than their predecessors or successors (they might have been 
complacent about them, but that is a different matter).
112
  What the above 
 
 107.  Id. at 64 n.31 (citation omitted). 
 108.  See, e.g., KROOSS, supra note 95, at 50–58 (examining how corporate managers in 
the 1920s-1960s envisioned a wider role for business than had been traditional).  Despite 
Levitt’s polemic, it’s not clear that businessmen were actually less interested in making 
profits during this period.  See id. at 55–57. 
 109.  Theodore Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibility, 36 HARV. BUS. REV. 42, 42 
(1958) (citation omitted). 
 110.  See generally ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF 
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS (1998) 
(suggesting that the corporate quest for social and moral legitimacy spurred an array of 
public relations initiatives); WALL, supra note 56 (describing how corporations developed 
imagery to build their own corporate culture). 
 111.  WALL, supra note 56, at 189. 
 112.  Indeed, as the American Business Creed made clear, the “classic” ideology of small 
business and competitiveness did not disappear during the 1950s.  SUTTON, supra note 101, 
at 34–36. 
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discussion does show is that a surprisingly wide swathe of individuals, 
from leftist social critics, to moderate theorists of the corporation, to senior 
executives themselves, shared a set of assumptions about the corporation 
that varied both from what was believed earlier in the century and what is 
believed today:  They saw the corporation as having developed into a 
“social institution,” run by managers who had taken on responsibility to (at 
minimum) employees and consumers as well as shareholders, or (at 
maximum) all of society.  As I will argue in the next section, this 
managerial ideology also structured the discourse of mid-century 
corporation law. 
III. CORPORATE LAW AT MID-CENTURY 
A. Managerial Theory and Corporate Law 
An initial point to be made about corporation law scholarship in the 
long 1950s is that its practitioners didn’t act as though it was dead.  In 
1959, New York University school of law professor Miguel A. de Capriles 
published a retrospective piece entitled Fifteen-Year Survey of Corporate 
Developments, 1944-1959, where he made what might seem a surprising 
claim:  “The post-World War II years hold a particular fascination for 
corporation lawyers.”
113
  In Manning’s account, postwar corporate law was 
at best moribund, characterized by absurd doctrines, in the grip of a 
formalism abandoned in other areas of law.  To de Capriles, however, the 
1950s were a particularly vital time for corporation law, not least because 
the corporation, and corporation law, had been called to play a role in the 
long ideological struggle in which America now found itself.  “The end of 
armed conflict in the shadow of the atomic bomb was but the beginning of 
the cold war between East and West,”
114
 de Capriles wrote.  “The battle for 
men’s minds overshadowed the conquest of territories. And in a very real 
sense the corporate system of economic activity became a symbol of the 
‘American way of life’ for a large sector of our population.”
115
  The Cold 
War thus made it important to defend America’s corporate capitalism, and 
the spokesman and image of that capitalist system was the corporate-
statesman of managerialism.  “[T]he notion that the corporate system 
should be a ‘socially responsible’ capitalism has . . . gained broad 
acceptance,” de Capriles wrote, while the “steady rise of professional 
 
 113.  Miguel A. de Capriles, Fifteen-Year Survey of Corporate Developments, 1944-
1959, 13 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959). 
   114.    Id.  
 115.  Id. 
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management has also seen its leaders publicly express views concerning 
the obligations of modern corporate enterprise that before World War II 
were largely limited to academicians and New Dealers.”
116
  In the years 
after World War II, he continued, “[c]ontrol of corporate management for 
the protection of the investor and the public is a central theme; its 
counterpoint is the demand of management for freedom to manage.”
117
 
Managerialism had helped define the grand themes of corporation law 
in these decades, but what did that mean?  Did this kind of heroic 
managerialism actually have an impact on how the law regulated and 
ordered corporations?  Certainly, corporate law doctrine was not 
transformed during the 1950s; it evolved in various mundane ways, but the 
ground rules for corporate governance in 1965 were not so terribly different 
from that of 1945 (a point to which we will return).  Nor did heroic 
managerialism resurrect the debate within corporate law as to what the 
corporate “person” really was—a creation of the state or of its 
incorporators?
118
  To measure managerialism’s impact, we must look 
instead to specific debates over the corporation’s purpose, power, and 
governance that flourished in the 1950s.  In this Part, I survey the impact 
managerialism had on corporate law theory and practice (or, perhaps, 
corporate law scholarship high and low).  In the first section, I show how 
corporate law theory of this era was threaded through with the ideas and 
ideals of heroic managerialism.  Indeed, some of the era’s main scholarly 
interests and preoccupations only make sense against the background of 
high managerialist ideas.
119
  The managerial vision appears with greatest 
force in three issues seen as vital then, and either treated as peripheral or 
changed utterly, today:  corporate charitable contributions, proposals to 
“constitutionalize the corporation,” and the struggles over shareholder 
democracy.  A later section will essay managerialism’s impact on more 
 
   116.    Id. 
 117.  Id. at 2. 
 118.  This is surprising, since discussing the corporation as a “social institution” 
hearkens back to earlier debates over whether the corporation was a “real” or “artificial” 
entity.  There are isolated instances of such discussions—one observer, for instance, spoke 
of the modern corporation’s transformation into a “social organism conscious of its public 
functions, its social responsibilities, and of the force of public opinion,” but I found no 
evidence of greatly renewed interest in corporate personhood.  Friedmann, supra note 65, at 
171.  
 119.  I do not want to say these ideas constituted a “paradigm” for corporation law, as 
the term is overused and makes it appear that I am applying wholesale Thomas Kuhn’s 
model to an area, corporate law scholarship, where it may be inappropriate.  See Cheffins, 
supra note 3, at 478 (2004) (observing that legal scholarship cannot conform both to a 
Kuhnian framework and a scientifically-oriented cumulative model).  The set of ideas 
discussed here are neither as fixed nor coherent as I understand a natural scientific paradigm 
to be but I am employing a similar concept. 
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ordinary corporate law doctrine. 
1. Corporate Charitable Contributions 
Corporate charitable contributions were a major scholarly issue during 
the 1950s.  Nowadays, such contributions are specifically provided for in 
statute, and when justified at all are typically tied to some form of long-
term benefit, however tenuous, claimed to inure to the corporate donor.
120
  
They were still a comparative novelty in the postwar era, however; before 
the war, the general assumption, and majority common-law rule, had been 
that corporate charitable donations were outside the corporation’s power 
(ultra vires), though gifts made with “a view of [the corporation] receiving 
material benefits therefrom” were sometimes permitted.
121
 
The landmark postwar case that broke with this tradition was A. P. 
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld, 
under the common law, A. P. Smith Manufacturing’s donation of $1500 to 
Princeton University.
122
  Though the New Jersey court repeated the 
perennial justification for corporate charity‒that it would ultimately 
redound to benefit the giver
123
‒the court also put forward additional, very 
different justifications for corporate charity, ones unconnected to self-
benefit but closely allied to the times and the vision of the corporation as a 
“social institution.”  “[M]odern conditions require that corporations 
acknowledge and discharge social as well as private responsibilities as 
members of the communities within which they operate.”
124
  Citing The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, and looking back to the classic 
defense of corporate social responsibility offered by Merrick Dodd’s 1932 
article For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, the court noted that, 
during the twentieth century, “[c]ontrol of economic wealth has passed 
 
 120.  See, e.g., JAMES COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 4.03, at 63-64 (2d 
ed. 2005); see also Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, 
the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 
(1994) (positing that legal scholarship does not correctly explain corporate giving). 
 121.  See, e.g., HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 58, at 207–08 
(1927) (rule to be drawn from cases cited was that that corporations had leeway to make 
donations, so long as there was a persuasive “material benefit” accruing therefrom); see also 
A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 584 (N.J. 1953) (deciding that corporate gift-
giving is permissible under certain circumstances). 
 122. A. P. Smith  98 A.2d at 581.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey also made sure to 
note that the gift could also be defended as providing long-run benefits to the corporation.  
See id. at 583–85. 
 123.  Id. at 585 (“[C]orporations are permitted to make substantial contributions which 
have the outward form of gifts where the activity being promoted by the so-called gift tends 
reasonably to promote the good-will of the business of the contributing corporation.”). 
 124.  Id. at 586. 
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largely from individual entrepreneurs to dominating corporations,” 
justifying new demands on the corporation.
125
  With the “transfer of most of 
the wealth to corporate hands,” the court reasoned, individuals have 
“turned to corporations to assume the modern obligations of good 
citizenship in the same manner as humans do.”
126
  This justification offered 
was tied up with the managerial vision dating back to Berle & Means in 
which “dominating corporations” had gathered up the bulk of the nation’s 
wealth and thus found themselves with new responsibilities, called upon to 
assume new duties not only to shareholders but the communities within 
which they operated.
127
  The decision also reflected faith in the managers of 
those corporations, who, as Gregory Mark later characterized it, would 
know “what [was] good for the United States.”
128
 
A second justification also wove through the case—one that linked 
corporate good citizenship to the Cold War and the need to demonstrate the 
success of the nation’s economic system.  In World Wars I and II, the court 
stated, corporations made charitable donations to “insure survival.”
129
  
Now, continued the court, when “we are faced with other, though 
nonetheless vicious, threats from abroad, which must be withstood without 
impairing the vigor of our democratic institutions at home,” donations were 
again justified “in terms of the actual survival of the corporation in a free 
enterprise system.”
130
  Communist threats to free enterprise, in other words, 
justified corporate donations. 
A. P. Smith was not quite as groundbreaking as it may have appeared 
at the time; after all, one of the court’s justifications for upholding the gift 
to Princeton was that New Jersey and twenty-eight other states had adopted 
statutes permitting corporate charitable giving.
131
  It did, however, give 
corporation scholars another example to hammer their argument that the 
corporation was evolving into a social institution and to assert that new 
legal rules were, or soon would be, evolving along with it.  Berle contended 
 
 125.  Id. at 584. 
 126.  Id. at 586.  In a fascinating and odd twist, A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company. 
appealed the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
where certiorari was denied.  Its attorney on appeal was A. A. Berle.  Mitchell, supra note 
14, at 206–07.  Tsuk Mitchell speculates, no doubt correctly, that Berle took this on so he 
could argue the question of a corporation’s powers in front of the highest court in the land. 
Id. 
 127.  A. P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586.  The court upheld the grant apart from the statute, but 
also held that the statute operated to alter the corporation’s preexisting charter.  See id. at 
589–90. 
 128.  Mark, supra note 14, at 638. 
 129.  A. P. Smith, 98 A.2d at 586. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See id. at 587.  The MBCA included a provision allowing charitable gifts in its 
1950 revisions. 
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that A.P. Smith showed that “the state has authorized corporations to 
withhold from their shareholders a portion of their profits, channeling it to 
schools, colleges, hospitals, research, and other good causes.”
132
  Richard 
Eells, a Columbia Business School professor, claimed that the decision, and 
corporate charitable contribution statutes more generally, demonstrated that 
the modern corporation was no longer merely an economic unit but a social 
and political one as well, a “basic unit in our multigroup society” with its 
powers “an expression of a method for implementing the needs of 
society.”
133
 
Even some more skeptical of the growth of corporate charity agreed 
that its acceptance in legal doctrine showed that the corporation was 
evolving from a purely economic institution, devoted to shareholder 
wealth, to a more benevolent social institution.  In his 1960 article, Love 
and the Business Corporation, New York University corporate law 
professor Bert Prunty sketched, in familiar managerial terms, the 
connection between changes in the corporation’s social role and 
corporation law:  “Social and economic evolution in our society inexorably 
brought about a mutation in the public image of one of its most important 
institutions—the business corporation . . . . As fear of the corporate Titan 
began to wither, legal doctrine rooted in that fear began to atrophy.”
134
  
That same year attorney Louis Kelso, writing in the Business Lawyer, 
attacked the new model:  “‘corporate good citizen,’” which was “coming to 
focus [its] institutional attention upon their duty (as [its] executives see it) 
to serve mankind.”
135
  Corporate charitable gifts, and more generally the 
use of the business corporation to carry out “social objectives,” were, he 
feared, “another step towards the conversion of the business corporation 
from an economic entity into a political entity.”
136
  This view was not 
universal.  Some scholars argued (in retrospect, correctly) that corporate 
charity did not augur a change in corporate purpose and that a gift could be 
justified as benefitting shareholders, but the fact that so many took 
corporate charity to herald a fundamental change in corporations’ 
orientations illustrates the pervasiveness of managerial beliefs and the way 
they infiltrated corporation law discourse.
137
 
 
 132.  BERLE, supra note 46, at 168. 
 133.  RICHARD EELLS, CORPORATION GIVING IN A FREE SOCIETY 83 (1956). 
 134.  Bert S. Prunty Jr., Love and the Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REV. 467, 468 
(1960).  It should be noted that Prunty seriously doubted that corporate charity would be as 
disinterested as its advocates hoped.  See id. at 476. 
 135.  Louis O. Kelso, Corporate Benevolence or Welfare Redistribution?, 15 BUS. LAW. 
259, 259 (1960). 
 136.  Id. at 260. 
 137.  For one skeptic about the larger import of corporate charity, see Wilber G. Katz, 
Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J. L. & ECON. 75, 82 (1960) (“The only 
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2. Constitutionalizing the Corporation 
The belief that the large corporation had become a dominant social 
institution gave rise to another proposal powerful in the 1950s, 
“Constitutionalizing the Corporation.”
138
  As with much else, this can be 
traced back to Berle & Means, who hinted in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property that the corporation might supplant the state, but by the 
1950s proposals to somehow impose constitutional limits on the 
corporation also meshed with broader social and legal currents.  By then, 
many accepted that the corporation would soon be as powerful as the state, 
if it wasn’t already.  Drucker, for instance, had written in the Concept of the 
Corporation that the corporation was now “the institution which sets the 
standard for the way of life and the mode of living of our citizens; which 
leads, molds, and directs; which determines our perspective on our own 
society; around which crystallizes our social problems and to which we 
look for their solution.”
139
  Amherst College political scientist Robert 
Latham, whose work appears in law reviews, seems to have made a career 
of insisting that the corporation had become chief rival to the state, 
claiming that it “governs as surely as the state in the formal literature,”
140
 
and therefore there needed to be applied to corporations “the whole pattern 
of controls laid upon the states when the Federal Republic was created 
under the Constitution of 1787.”
141
 
This argument that constitutional limits should apply to corporations 
was one aspect of a movement to impose those limits on a range of large 
institutions, deriving from pluralist theories that saw Big Business, Big 
Labor, and sometimes other organized groups as growing to rival the 
traditional state.
142
  According to Columbia law professor Wolfgang 
 
statutes or cases which suggest any departure from [the standard set out in Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Co.] are those relating to corporate gifts.”). 
 138.  This movement was most popular in the 1950s and early 1960s, though it did not 
disappear immediately.  See, e.g., RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN, & JOEL SELIGMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF 
GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976) (arguing for federal charting of corporations). 
 139.  DRUCKER, supra note 75, at 6–7 (quoted in Friedmann, supra note 65, at 170). 
   140.   Robert Latham, The Commonwealth of the Corporation, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 25, 32 
(1960). 
 141.  Id. at 35 (1960) (emphasis omitted).  Latham’s statements appear extreme, but he 
was a respected voice in debates over the corporation in the 1950s.  See, e.g., ROBERT 
LATHAM, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 
218 (Edward S. Mason, ed., 1959). 
 142.  See, e.g., Arthur S. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the “Security State”, 10 
STAN. L. REV. 620, 656 (1958) (“With the continuing ‘pluralizing’ of American society and 
increasing recognition of the governmental power of private groups, it can be forecast with 
some certainty this the trend of the Court of public-izing private groups will continue.  It is 
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Friedmann, not only corporations but unions, trade associations, and even 
foundations, were among the “highly organized groups [that] have taken 
over the substance of sovereignty” and therefore needed to be tamed.
143
  
Yale’s labor law specialist (and later Dean) Harry Wellington agreed, 
summing up this development in 1960 by writing that: 
[r]anging wide through society and deep into the Constitution 
commentators have suggested that all or most ‘powerful’ private 
groups should be subject to all or most provisions of the 
Constitution.  The business corporation and the labor union have 
been the principal target of these suggestions, and the Bill of 
Rights and the fourteenth amendment have been envisioned as 
the principal instruments for control.
144
 
Though the literature on corporations was not inconsiderable, even more 
appears to have been written on constitutionalizing unions during this 
period.
145
 
To twenty-first century readers, there is a quixotic air to these 
proposals, but they fit with real developments in 1950s constitutional 
law.
146
  As Dalia Tsuk Mitchell has noted, recent Supreme Court decisions 
appeared to stretch the notion of who constituted a “state actor” for 
purposes of constitutional protections.
147
  In Shelley v. Kramer (1948), the 
Supreme Court barred state judicial enforcement of private racial 
covenants.
148
  In Marsh v. Alabama (1946), it applied First and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections to block attempts to suppress leafleting in a 
company-owned town.
149
  “The basic emerging concept,” Berle asserted in 
1951, “appears to be a restatement, in economic terms, of the constitutional 
requirement that every man is entitled to ‘equal protection of the laws,’ and 
 
the important constitutional law development of the mid-twentieth century.”). 
 143.  Friedmann, supra note 65, at 165. 
 144.  Harry H. Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and “Government 
Action”, 70 YALE L.J. 345, 346 (1961).  Wellington’s article asked whether union acts were 
“state action” under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 145.   See id.; see also Clay P. Malick, Toward a New Constitutional Status for Labor 
Unions, 21 ROCKY MNTN.. L. REV. 260 (1949) (proposing a change to the political and legal 
theory in order to account for the complexities inherent to both political parties and trade 
unions); Joseph Rauh, Civil Rights and Liberties and Labor Unions, 8 LAB. L.J. 874 (1957) 
(discussing the union movement and its impact on economic democracy); Clyde W. 
Summers, The Right to Join a Union, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1947) (discussing the social 
and economic aspects of the exclusion from worker unions and proposing solutions to 
address those issues). 
 146.  See generally Arthur Miller, Constitutional Law of the “Security State”, 10 STAN. 
L. REV. 620. 
 147.  Mitchell, supra note 14, at 204–06. 
 148.  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 149.  326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
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that no arm of the state shall deny him life, liberty or property without due 
process of law.”
150
 
But what would it mean to apply the Constitution to corporations?  
Here, as in many of the more theoretical debates in the 1950s over the 
corporation and the law, details were lacking.  In a 1952 article, Berle 
suggested that “[i]f, for instance, a corporation dealing in goods or services 
essential to the life of the individual discriminates against a customer on 
the ground of race or in a matter which invades his Constitutional right of 
freedom of speech or religion,” it would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
151
  Latham speculated, perhaps fancifully, on how applying 
constitutional provisions could change the corporation.  Citing the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, he asked, “[d]oes this mean that 
stockholders of General Motors should be given free access to the public 
facilities of duPont [sic] or General Electric?  Can executive personnel of 
AT&T demand keys to the more private precincts usually reserved for the 
executive personnel of Metropolitan Life?”
152
  Other constitutional 
provisions also raised questions. 
Section 10 of Article I would forbid [corporations] to remit bills of 
credit and so centralize—nationalize—all banking in the country.  Nor 
could they grant titles of nobility, a blow against fraternal orders, surely.  
And they would all be disarmed, having lost to the Federal Government the 
power to raise and maintain armies.  This would presumably put 
Pinkerton’s and Brink’s out of business.
153
 
It could be noted that the previous two topics exist in tension.  The 
move to allow corporate charity for the general good broadened the scope 
of managerial autonomy, while proposals to impose new constitutional 
limits on the corporation limited its autonomy.  Yet each grew out of the 
new view of the corporation as a dominant social institution, capable of 
wielding great power over, and therefore having obligations towards, 
employees, communities, and other constituencies, and the 
acknowledgment that managerial power was, for good or ill, increasingly 
unchecked.  This does not, however, explain the third topic here—the 
movement for shareholder democracy. 
 
 150.  A. A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, 19 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 639, 656–57 (1952) [hereinafter Developing Law]; see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., 
Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from 
Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1952) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Limitations] (discussing new developments in economic constitutional law 
and the impacts that area of law may have on legal and social thinking); BERLE, supra note 
46. 
 151.  Developing Law, supra note 150, at 658. 
 152.  Latham, supra note 140, at 36. 
 153.  Latham, supra note 140, at 37.  
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3. Shareholder Democracy 
“Shareholder Democracy” was one of the most visible, if least 
consequential, issues for corporate law in the 1950s.  “Shareholder 
democracy” (or “corporate democracy”) is of course one of the perennial 
issues in modern corporate law.
154
  No matter the balance of power between 
managers and shareholders, advocates for shareholders believe they should 
have more (and, one supposes, managers think the opposite).  Yet 
shareholder democracy also had a particular attraction in the 1950s, for if 
the large corporation was increasingly transforming itself into a “social 
institution” to rival the state, it would seem logical to apply to it the 
democratic governance mechanisms of the state.  In the 1950s, shareholder 
democracy gained widespread attention due in part to two attention-getting 
shareholder “gadflies,” Lewis Gilbert
155
 and Wilma Soss (and her 
Federation of Women Shareholders in American Business, Inc.), who 
visited dozens of annual meetings each year and loudly demanded a raft of 
reforms, from meetings in convenient locations, to better disclosure, to 
cumulative voting for directors, to a woman on the board of directors 
(Soss’s particular issue).
156
  The rhetoric of “shareholder democracy” was 
encouraged by publicity from the New York Stock Exchange, which 
commissioned studies announcing that one family in three owned stock and 
that the nation had entered an era of “People’s Capitalism” (ironically, the 
NYSE campaign was intended to prevent further government intervention 
in corporate affairs).
157
  Campaigns for shareholder democracy testify to the 
era’s managerial ethos; while they were in some ways pushback against 
unchecked managerial power, they also reflected the degree to which 
managerialism was the dominant assumption of the time—as both the 
movement’s hopes and disappointments show. 
In the 1950s, shareholder democrats were swimming against a 
managerial tide.  When two corporate law scholars published a work 
advocating Shareholder Democracy in 1954, they concluded not with a 
 
 154.  See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder 
Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1547–60 (2006). 
 155.  See generally LEWIS D. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND DEMOCRACY (1956) (recounting 
Mr. Gilbert’s personal experiences as a shareholder and providing advice on how to engage 
corporate boards as a shareholder); LEWIS D. & JOHN J. GILBERT, ANNUAL REPORTS OF 
STOCKHOLDERS’ ACTIVITIES AT CORPORATE MEETINGS (1939). 
 156.  On Soss, there is a wonderful contemporary profile in the New Yorker.  See Andy 
Logan, Hoboken Must Go! NEW YORKER, Mar. 17, 1951, at 34. 
 157.  JOSEPH LIVINGSTON, AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 27 (1958) (describing the New 
York Stock Exchange’s efforts to publicize widespread stock ownership); see also WALL, 
supra note 56, at 198–200 (describing general efforts to promote the use of the term, 
“people’s capitalism”). 
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ringing defense of profit maximization or shareholder primacy, which one 
would expect, but with a nod to managerialism, conceding that “[t]he 
interests of shareholders are not the only interests besides management’s 
that must be recognized by today’s publicly held corporation.  There are the 
interests of labor, of the consumer, of the country as a whole, and 
ultimately of the entire international community that must be 
considered.”
158
  They then defended easier shareholder access to the proxy 
machinery not solely as a way for shareholders to defend their own 
interests, but as a vehicle for “affording a broader social outlook in solving 
corporate issues.”
159
  In other words, shareholder democracy would better 
serve a managerial vision.  Despite this concession, a reviewer of the work 
in the Harvard Law Review dismissed much of its concerns by asking 
whether “is it not time to recognize that shareholder democracy, with its 
exclusive focus on the profit-making element in corporate activity, has a 
slightly old-fashioned ring?”
160
 
More evidence of the decline of shareholder power, and the ascent of 
management, comes from two areas that should have offered hopes for 
shareholder empowerment.  One concerned Shareholder Proposals, the 
usually precatory shareholder statements that SEC regulations require be 
included in a company’s proxy statement.
161
  SEC Rule 14a-8, which 
mandates inclusion of such proposals, was first adopted in 1942, in what 
could be seen as a late burst of New Deal enthusiasm for grassroots 
(shareholder) democracy; the requirement is still sometimes referred to as 
the “Town Hall rule.”
162
  While the initial rule was broadly worded, its 
scope steadily eroded during the 1950s.
163
  As early as 1945, the SEC’s 
Division of Corporate Finance allowed firms to omit proposals of a 
“general political, social, or economic nature,” an approach that justified 
the 1951 exclusion by Greyhound Corporation of a proposal attacking 
 
 158.  FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A 
BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 149 (1954). 
 159.  Id. at 150. 
 160.  L. C. B. Gower, Shareholder Democracy, 68 HARV. L. REV. 922, 927 (1955) 
(reviewing FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A 
BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS (1954)). 
 161.  This is assuming certain requirements are met, notably SEC Rule 14a-8. 
 162.  See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in 
Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 879-80 (1994) (discussing the history and use of 
Rule 14a-8 and criticizing the SEC role in managing and enforcing the rule); see also Frank 
D. Emerson & Franklin C. Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1952).  The rule was initially justified as giving shareholders notice 
of certain policy issues to be discussed at annual meetings.  Id. at 893. 
 163.  See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, The End of Corporate Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
703, 718–19 (2009) (discussing a series of SEC amendments that dramatically altered the 
original shareholder proposal rule). 
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segregation on its buses in the South.
164
  In 1954, the Rule was further 
scaled back, now requiring that proposals that were resubmitted to 
corporations receive increasing percentage votes each year or face 
exclusion, and also allowing corporations to exclude proposals that 
impinged on their ordinary business operations.
165
  As one group of critics 
put it, the changes could not be described as “other than imposing new 
restrictions on shareholders and affording further protection for 
management.”
166
 
Nor did advocates of shareholder democracy find much succor in the 
rare instances when shareholders’ votes were actively sought:  proxy 
contests between management and insurgents trying to seize control of a 
corporate board.
167
  While looked down upon by many as mere struggles to 
see who would feed at the corporate trough,
168
 proxy contests involving 
entrenched management and corporate “raiders” did enjoy an uptick during 
the decade,
169
 and a few of the contests, such as that for the New York 
Central Railroad or Montgomery Ward, drew wide attention.  The contests 
did not, however, produce greater shareholder empowerment.  If anything, 
they served mainly to allow further managerial entrenchment, as they 
produced judicial decisions making clear that while incumbent managers 
could always claim reimbursement from their corporation for expenses in a 
proxy contest, challengers could only receive reimbursement if they won 
and then received shareholder approval, a precedent that would obviously 
discourage insurgents.
170
  Far from democratizing the corporation, “the 
modern proxy contest [was] at best a device for tempering autocracy by 
invasion.”
171
 
 
 164.  JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 270 (3d ed. 
2003) (citing Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)); see also Robert 
B. von Mehren & John C. McCarroll, The Proxy Rules: A Case Study in the Administrative 
Process, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 728, 738 (1964) (quoting SEC Rel. No. 34-4775 
(1952)). 
 165.  See David C. Bayne et al., Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making Process: the 
1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REV. 387, 427–28 (1954) (describing the new 1954 rule and 
the deleterious impact on individual shareholders). 
 166.  Id. at 427. 
 167.  Shareholder proxies were also, of course, sought annually for board elections, but 
since these elections were not contested they offered little in the way of active democracy. 
 168.  See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate Management 
Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 47–48 (Edward S. Mason, ed., 
1959) (stating various opportunistic motives for corporate raiders). 
 169.  See Mitchell, supra note 163, at 719. 
 170.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 697–98 (2007).  The leading case is Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 
128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955). 
 171.  Bayless Manning, Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1488 (1958) (reviewing J. A. 
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While challenging shareholder democracy would seem akin to 
attacking apple pie or motherhood, advocates of heroic managerialist ideas 
were against it, and indeed were skeptical of shareholder suffrage 
altogether.  This makes sense, for if the corporation were no longer to be 
run solely in the interests of shareholders, why should shareholders claim 
exclusive right to govern it?  Berle had long dismissed the shareholder vote 
as ceremonial, seeing the possibility of shareholders voting out 
management as nil; “[m]anagements of the major giants,” he wrote, “are 
for practical purposes impregnable.”
172
  Drucker believed that shareholder 
voting in large enterprises should be abolished, with shares replaced by 
“certificates of investment” entitling the holder only to a share in profits 
and in assets upon liquidation.
173
 
Other legal scholars were also skeptical of schemes to empower 
shareholders, and pointed to managerial ideas to justify their beliefs.  In a 
1958 review, Bayless Manning concluded that for all of the claims of 
shareholder democracy, its results largely proved Berle and Means right.  
In 1932, he wrote, Berle and Means had found “a virtually omnipotent 
management and an impotent shareholdership.”
174
  Since then, there had 
come “a [new] world of SEC regulation, extensive disclosure requirements, 
elaborate proxy machinery, stock Exchange self-discipline, corporate Good 
Citizenship, People’s Capitalism and Corporate Democracy.”
175
  And what 
was the end result of all this?—“a virtually omnipotent management and an 
impotent shareholdership.”
176
 
Shareholder democracy, Manning concluded, was a diversion from 
genuine reform based on a misunderstanding of the modern corporation: 
Thanks to the pioneering work of Berle, Drucker and a few 
others, we have long known that in our modern industrial system, 
it is the corporation as an institution which is permanent and the 
shareholders who are transitory. . . . We have known, too, that 
today’s large corporation may for many purposes be best viewed 
as an intricate, centralized, economic-administrative structure run 
by professional managers who hire capital from the investor.
177
 
Given that, he urged, or at least proposed as a thought experiment, that 
 
LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958)). 
 172.  ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 63 (1959).  Berle did not necessarily believe in abolishing 
the shareholder vote; he just did not think it performed any real function. 
 173.  DRUCKER, supra note 90, 341. 
 174.  Manning, supra note 171, at 1485. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 1489 (citation omitted). 
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the law be made to conform more closely to (managerialist) reality and that 
shareholders be deprived of voting rights, their interests to be protected by 
some mechanism overseeing “management’s behavior in corporate matters 
affecting their personal interests . . . .”
178
  Other legal scholars voiced equal 
skepticism; in 1960, Abram Chayes attacked shareholder democracy 
because, he argued, “[o]f all those standing in relation to the large 
corporation, the shareholder is least subject to its power.”
179
  Far better, he 
claimed, would be a system that gave power to other constituencies more 
directly affected by corporate power.
180
 
Managerialist assumptions also found their way into more popular 
writings about shareholder power.  In 1958, James Livingston, long-time 
business editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, opened his study of The 
American Stockholder by referencing two touchstones of managerialism, 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property and Burnham’s Managerial 
Revolution.
181
  Those works, he said, demonstrated the overwhelming 
power of managers.  “[M]anagers of corporations control the proxy 
machinery, the ballot, even as a politician dominates a ward, a county, or a 
city. . . . Further, through their control of men, materials, machinery, and 
money—the corporate organization—these managers exert great power in 
American affairs—politics, society, and business.”
182
  In his book, 
Livingston demolished the claims of shareholder democracy, arguing that 
shareholders were not and would not become a self-conscious class, and 
that their power was illusory.  While gadflies might insist that managers 
were just shareholders’ hirelings, the fact was “that the stockholder hires 
nobody.  He is the hireling—or, at least, his money is.  A cynical economist 
would say, ‘Capital doesn’t hire management, management hires 
capital.’”
183
  While shareholders were the ostensible subject of Livingston’s 
book, management loomed over it.  Citing Drucker, Livingston concluded 
that corporations’ main concerns were their “permanent relatives,” 
including unions, customers, and suppliers, and not shareholders, whom 
they treated like “poor relations.”
184
  Livingston was no friend of corporate 
management—he particularly attacked what he believed was excessive 
 
 178.  Id. at 1491.  Manning was clear that he did not actually believe in abolishing 
shareholder voting, but that he thought that entertaining the possibility would bring into 
focus what protections and rules were actually needed.  See id. at 1491–93. 
 179.  Chayes, supra note 81, at 40. 
 180.  Id. at 41. 
 181.  LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 14–16.  Livingston had one advantage 
other journalists may have lacked; he was a friend of Bayless Manning.  See Manning, 
supra note 171, at 1477 n.1. 
 182.  Id. at 15. 
 183.  Id. at 23. 
 184.  See id. at 220–21. 
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compensation—but he did not think empowering small shareholders would 
change management’s behavior.
185
  In the struggle between shareholders 
and management, management had long since won. 
The language and assumptions of managerialism, and of the 
corporation as a “social institution,” were pervasive enough that even 
critics of specific managerialist proposals began with its assumptions, and 
those who dissented from managerialism depicted themselves as an 
embattled minority.  In 1960, for example, Manning published an article 
replying to recent works in “[t]he political sociology of the business 
corporation,” focusing his ire on their habit of reifying the “corporation,” 
which was after all only a legal form, and of treating corporate “power” as 
an undifferentiated lump, available to be used in any way managers 
desired.
186
  Even this skeptic, however, shared many of the managerialists’ 
assumptions.  He decried vague attacks on “corporate power,” while 
conceding that the United States contained many giant institutions (he 
dubbed them “Alpha Institutions”), apparently including business entities, 
unions, and foundations, whose main features were “centralized control, 
large scale organization, substantial capital resources and relative 
independence of formally constituted government.”
187
  He was all for 
analysis and criticism of such institutions; he just disliked what he 
perceived as the intellectually lazy path followed by others.
188
  Another 
example is provided by Yale Law School’s Dean, Eugene V. Rostow, who 
in To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible?, 
his essay in The Corporation in Modern Society, blasted advocates of 
managerialism and called, on economic grounds, for a return to a doctrine 
requiring directors to maximize profits on behalf of shareholders.
189
  But 
Rostow acknowledged in his essay that he was pushing against “the 
emerging ethos of the second half of the twentieth century . . . [that] 
corporate property [is] really that of the directors and the management, to 
dispose of, as many suggest, in accordance with their own standards of 
business foresight, social statesmanship, and generalized good 
citizenship . . . .”
190
 
 
 185.  Livingston held somewhat greater hopes for institutional investors.  See id. at 245–
48. 
 186.  Manning, supra note 85 at 40. 
 187.  Id. at 43. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See Rostow, supra note 168, at 70–71.  One of Rostow’s major concerns was that 
managerialism would lead to pricing decisions divorced from economic requirements, 
leading to serious economic malfunctions. 
 190.  Id. at 49–50. 
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B. Change and Continuity in Corporate Law 
Heroic managerial ideas threaded through corporate law scholarship 
and theory as well as popular discourse over the corporation.  But they did 
surprisingly little to change the doctrines and practices of everyday 
corporate law.  Which raises the question:  Why? 
1. Heroic Managerialism in Theory and Practice 
If one looks hard enough, some aspects of corporate law appear to 
have been at least inflected by managerial assumptions.  When the law did 
bend in the 1950s, it often bent towards managerial autonomy.  Certainly, 
the evolution of corporate charitable giving and the SEC’s shareholder 
proposal rules, both discussed above, fit with managerial assumptions. 
Another area where managerial assumptions fit well with doctrinal 
developments was the Business Judgment Rule.  Since at least the late 
nineteenth century, the rule, a judicial assumption that in the execution of 
their duties directors have exercised reasonable diligence and care, has 
been the first line of defense for corporate directors against shareholder 
challenges to their decisions.
191
  As Gregory Mark has pointed out, the 
1950s were the heyday of the Business Judgment Rule; the two decades 
after the war’s end “include the highest points of judicial deference to 
managerial discretion in the history of corporate law.”
192
  In New York’s 
courts, according to Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, the Business Judgment Rule was 
expanded during this period so that it no longer just blocked judicial 
inquiry into decisions made with ordinary care, but even shielded grossly 
negligent decisions.
193
 
Statutory developments also made it more difficult for shareholders to 
challenge managers’ decisions.  Derivative suits, long the avenue for 
shareholders to attack self-dealing by managers, were sharply limited in the 
1940s.  As a reaction to the perceived problem of frivolous “strike suits” in 
the 1930s, legislatures in a number of jurisdictions, beginning with New 
York, passed laws making such suits more difficult.
194
  New York’s law, 
 
 191.  See, e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 121, § 58 (indicating the instances in which a 
board of directors is allowed to use its discretion and business judgment in making certain 
donations and gifts, which would normally be a violation of the rights of stockholders). 
 192.  Mark, supra note 14, at 636.  A similar point is made in Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, 
Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
BUS. 63, 116–20 (2009).  My account of the Business Judgment Rule here depends on their 
work. 
 193.  See Mitchell, supra note 192, at 118–20 (discussing Everett v. Phillips, 43 N.E.2d 
18 (N.Y. 1942)). 
 194.  See George D. Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits in 
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which required small shareholders (those owning less than $50,000 or 5% 
of a corporation’s shares) suing a corporation derivatively to post security 
for the corporation’s expenses and attorneys’ fees, drove down the number 
of suits in that state and was soon copied in many others.
195
  Only in the 
early 1960s would there be seen a revival of derivative suits.
196
  It is 
illustrative of how managerial ideology seeped into legal thought during 
this period that, when derivative suits began a comeback in the 1960s, one 
scholar attributed their increased popularity to the continuing power of the 
Berle-Means corporation, noting that corporate dominance of the American 
economy, and managers’ domination of the corporation, made all the more 
important the retention of the derivative suit, especially considering how 
few other checks remained on managerial power.
197
 
Similar issues arose in the period’s more thoroughgoing statutory 
reform, the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”).
198
  First mulled at 
the end of the 1930s, the American Bar Association began work on the 
MBCA in 1943 and issued a first draft in 1946, with revisions in 1950, 
1953, and 1955.
199
  As a Model Act, it was intended to provide flexible 
guidance for states revising corporate statues that had, in some instances, 
not been thoroughly updated since the late nineteenth century.  It was also 
intended as a more straightforward alternative to Delaware’s corporation 
statute, which the Model Act drafters rejected as excessively pro-
management, making “little or no effort to protect the rights of 
investors.”
200
  The Model Act was not, however, a radical departure from 
 
New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944) (describing laws passed to prevent strike suits).  
After New York’s 1942 act, similar statutes were adopted by a number of other states, 
including New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, see id., and in 1949 California, see Henry 
W. Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders’ Derivative Suits: How Far is California’s New 
“Security for Expenses” Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1949). 
 195.  George D. Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders’ Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (1947) (noting that in the two and a half years following the law’s adoption, only 
four derivative suits were filed in New York County, three of which were immediately 
dismissed for failure to comply with the statute).  New York’s statute also imposed a 
requirement for contemporaneous ownership and shortened the statute of limitations.  See 
id. at 5–7. 
 196.  Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74 (1967). 
 197.  See id. at 78–80. 
 198.  Though the MBCA’s evolution was towards greater managerial power, and 
deserves discussion here, it is probably less marked by the period than some other 
developments discussed in this Article, as statutes seem to have consistently evolved over 
the century toward greater managerial power. 
 199.  Whitney Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 11 BUS. LAW. 98, 98–99 
(1955). 
 200.  Id. at 100.  The MBCA was in turn modeled on Illinois’ 1933 corporation act.  See 
id.  The MBCA was also a successor to the 1920s Uniform Corporation Act, perceived as 
unsuccessful by the 1940s.  See Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law 
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existing statutes; like them, it was an enabling act, intended to provide 
some investor protections, along with a more up-to-date template for 
incorporators.
201
 
Whatever its original intentions, though, the MBCA soon came under 
fire as successive revisions ceded power to management.
202
  The first 
version of the Model Act, for instance, provided for mandatory cumulative 
voting, a strong protection for minority shareholders, but, when revised in 
1953, this was watered down both by making cumulative voting permissive 
and by allowing for “classifi[ed]” boards of directors.
203
  The 1950 Model 
Act barred loans to directors and officers, while allowing loans to 
employees; the 1953 Act, through a subtle change in wording, opened the 
door to such loans by allowing a corporation to “assist its employees, 
officers and directors.”
204
  While the 1946 Model Act required that the 
rights of shareholders be printed on stock certificates, the 1953 revision 
omitted this in favor of a weaker provision giving shareholders the right to 
request such information from the corporation.
205
 
By themselves, these revisions were merely further steps in the long 
march of limitations on shareholders’ rights; they may have reflected faith 
in management power, but such revisions were not unique to the 1950s.  
Yet, even battles over these changes show the spread of managerial 
concepts.  When corporate law scholar Frank Emerson (also an advocate of 
shareholder democracy) attacked the MBCA revisions, he cited work by 
Berle and C. Wright Mills to argue that there was greater need than ever for 
shareholder power because, as others had shown, “management power 
is . . . becoming increasingly dominant . . . .”
206
 
2. Understanding the Divide 
But for all the ubiquity of managerial precepts during the 1950s, for 
 
1920-1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573, 595 (2009) (identifying the Uniform Business 
Corporation Act as a source for the era’s state corporate law reforms). 
 201.  Katz, supra note 5, at 187–88. 
 202.  See Frank D. Emerson, The Roles of Management and Shareholders in Corporate 
Government, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231 (1958) (arguing that contemporary 
corporation statutes, as exemplified by the Model Act, substantially restrict shareholders’ 
rights by allowing management power to become increasingly dominant); Benjamin Harris, 
Jr., The Model Business Corporation Act—Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 NW. U. L. REV. 
1 (1955) (pointing out that the MBCA’s successive revisions have tended to free the hand of 
management in the use of corporate assets). 
 203.  Emerson, supra note 202, at 233. 
 204.  Harris, Jr., supra note 202, at 3. 
 205.  See id. at 11. 
 206.  Emerson, supra note 202, at 238. 
WELLS - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  12:45 PM 
348 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
all their invocation by corporate theorists and corporation law scholars, it 
must be concluded that heroic managerialism did not radically change the 
substance of corporate law. The statutes and rules governing the 
organization of the corporation, and the relationship between the 
corporation’s three acknowledged constituencies—shareholders, officers, 
and directors—changed little between the 1930s and the 1960s.  Nor were 
the presuppositions of corporate law transformed.  Neither of what now 
appear as the most significant changes in corporate law during this period, 
the MBCA and the development of close corporation statutes, were 
products of managerialism (though the MBCA may have been influenced a 
bit, as discussed above).
207
  Berle himself noted the disjunction between 
corporate theory and traditional corporate law in 1951, when, discussing 
constitutionalizing the corporation, he wrote that the developments he 
heralded were not based on “formal . . . ‘corporation law,’ the state statutes 
by which the creation and administration of a corporation are regulated.”
208
  
Almost a decade later, Dean Rostow, in his attack on managerialism, 
pointed out that for all the claims that managers should balance the 
interests of various constituencies, the “law books have always said that the 
board of directors owes a single-minded duty of unswerving loyalty to the 
stockholders,”
209
 while a few years later, a review of mid-century 
corporation acts noted that, apart from authorizing charitable gifts, the 
“‘social responsibility’ philosophy . . . had almost no influence upon recent 
statutes.”
210
  Looking back a decade later, Willard Hurst concluded that 
managerialism failed to change the basic assumptions of corporation law; 
except for allowing charitable donations, “the law added no definition of 
standards or rules to spell out for what purposes or by what means 
management might properly make decisions other than in the interests of 
shareholders.”
211
 
Why? Considering the visibility of heroic managerial ideas in the 
1950s, and their presence in the discourse of corporate law scholarship, 
some explanation is needed for why they had so little impact on the legal 
rules by which corporations were actually run.  A number suggest 
themselves.  For one, it may be too much to ask that corporation law 
change radically in the span of less than two decades.  Corporation law has 
 
 207.  On close corporation law, see Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation 
and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 263 (2008) (examining the 
process by which close corporations adopted a range of agreements and arrangements 
designed to privately order the close corporation). 
 208.  Constitutional Limitations, supra note 150, at 934. 
 209.  Rostow, supra note 168, at 63. 
 210.  Katz, supra note 5, at 189. 
 211.  O’SULLIVAN, supra note 73, at 102 (quoting HURST, supra note 1, at 107). 
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always been a conservative, not to say entrenched, field; and there may not 
have been time for high managerialist ideas to change the law significantly 
before they fell from favor in the 1960s. 
It may also be that ideas have never been the main drivers in the 
evolution of corporation law.  As David Kershaw has noted, the 
explanations most offered for the development of corporation law during 
the twentieth century, especially those that give pride of place to 
jurisdictional competition, emphasize political jockeying as producing legal 
change:  “These accounts share a theory of legal change which, in different 
guises, views legal change as the product of pressure exerted by economic 
and financial needs and interests of the market place and its constituent 
players.”
212
  Corporation law may change only in response to interest group 
pressures, or crises in economics and corporate governance, and lacking a 
good crisis, the mere existence and even popularity of managerial thought 
may not have been sufficient spur to alter the ground rules of corporation 
law, which existed not merely in the law reviews but in the statutes, case 
law, and legal practices of many separate jurisdictions. 
Perhaps as well corporation law did not change because it was fairly 
managerial to begin with—that is, corporation law already shielded 
managers from shareholders and, in practice if not in theory, gave 
managers remarkable leeway to direct corporate revenues to any one of a 
number of groups (shareholders, employees, themselves) they saw fit.  This 
was, after all, one of the critiques of corporation law advanced in Berle & 
Means and even before—that managers effectively controlled the 
corporation and had the power to direct its revenues as they wished.
213
  As 
shown above, shareholder power was thin in the 1950s, with voting, then as 
now, largely a formality, and few external checks on managerial power.
214
  
But this is insufficient to explain the theory’s lack of influence; corporation 
law may have been management-friendly, but shareholders still had some 
recourse against managers, and the more radical proposals of managerialist 
thinkers, such as the elimination of the board or shareholder voting, or 
transformation of managers’ fiduciary duties, never gained traction. 
A final possibility suggests itself:  that there was not merely a gap 
between high corporate theory and everyday corporate doctrine, but that the 
gap was particularly wide due to unusual features of both the theory and the 
 
 212.  David Kershaw, The Path of Fiduciary Law 2 (London Sch. of Econ. – Law Dep’t, 
Working Paper No. 6/2011, 2011) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs 
tract_id=1874763. 
 213.  See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3 (exploring the increased power and influence of 
managers in corporations when compared to other corporate entities). 
 214.  See supra text accompanying notes 154–67 (describing the loss of shareholder 
power and increased managerial influence). 
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doctrine.  The critique that legal scholars are largely disconnected from 
doctrinal work is of fairly recent vintage,
215
 but it seems to apply 
remarkably well to the situation of corporation law in the 1950s.  Bayless 
Manning’s own work tends to reflect and critique this split.  In The 
Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy, where he wrote that “corporation law, as 
a field of intellectual effort, is dead,”
216
 Manning attacked corporate law 
statutes and doctrine that he believed were divorced from the economic 
realities of the day.  The essay focused on the appraisal remedy—the right 
of dissenting shareholders to demand valuation and payment for their 
shares following certain “fundamental corporate transactions” such as a 
merger—to argue that much of corporate law was mired in rigid and long-
abandoned concepts of corporate personhood dating from the nineteenth 
century.
217
  Corporation law gave shareholders appraisal rights, he argued, 
because it clung to outmoded notions of the corporation as a freestanding 
and almost metaphysical entity “quite separate from the economic 
enterprise, three dimensional, virtually alive, a little bit sacred because of 
its ‘immortality’ and connection with the ‘sovereign,’ and withal terribly 
important.”
218
  The appraisal remedy was a product of that notion, for if the 
corporation was an “entity” akin to a Platonic idea, then a merger would 
transform it into something new, and shareholders should no more be 
forced by the law to trade their shares in the old corporation for shares in 
the new one, a wholly different entity, than the owner of a horse should be 
forced to exchange it for a cow.
219
  Of course, the notion that the 
corporation was a metaphysical entity had been abandoned by, at latest, the 
1920s, but Manning believed that the appraisal remedy, and so much else 
of corporate law, had not progressed since then.  The remedy was “a pure 
anachronism—a residual adaptation to an extinct theological problem.”
220
  
In other words, too much of corporate doctrine, too much of its rules and 
great corporation statutes, remained mired in intellectualized formalisms 
which the law needed to shake off. 
While corporate law statutes were trapped in the past, ossified 
survivors of the nineteenth century, contemporary thought about the 
corporation was bewitched by different but equally misguided notions.  In 
 
 215.  See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (criticizing law schools and law firms 
for abandoning their duty to produce ethical scholarship and practitioners, thus creating a 
disjunction between the legal education and legal profession.). 
 216.  Manning, supra note 1, at 245 n.37. 
 217.  Manning, supra note 1, at 245. 
 218.  Manning, supra note 1, at 245. 
 219.  Manning, supra note 1, at 245–46. 
 220.  Manning, supra note 1, at 248. 
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his review of Livingston’s American Stockholder, Manning laced into the 
proponents of corporate democracy for being seduced by political models 
of the corporation.  “Our historical absorption with the democratic 
process . . . ,” he wrote, “tempts us always to describe our environment in 
the verbal categories of democracy.”
221
  But infatuation with political 
metaphors led theorists to their own misunderstandings of the corporation 
and misguided policies, as “[t]he forms and mechanisms of shareholder 
democracy divert attention from the real problems of holding business 
managements to a desirable standard of responsibility.”
222
  In other words, 
contemporary legal theory of the corporation was equally wrong-headed, 
utilizing political language that masked the economic structure of the 
corporation which should, Manning believed, be the real concern of 
corporate law scholars.  In Manning’s accounts, corporate law scholars 
appear either stuck in doctrinal dead-ends or beguiled by wispy metaphors, 
in neither instance seriously engaging with the economic realities of the 
modern business organization.  It should be noted, of course, that 
Manning’s diagnosis was not universally shared; many corporate law 
scholars of the 1950s apparently practiced their trade without despairing of 
either corporation law’s statutes and doctrine or of its theorists’ ideas. 
At least in retrospect, there is much that is right in Manning’s 
diagnosis; at times the pronouncements of heroic managerialism appear 
hopelessly optimistic and divorced from economic reality, while doctrinal 
work that dwelled on the finer points of appraisal or par value seems 
pointless and stultifying.
223
  Yet even this explanation for managerialism’s 
lack of impact seems less than completely satisfying.  Manning’s image of 
corporate law professors bewitched by one unsatisfactory metaphor or 
another may well capture an important aspect of corporate law in the 
1950s—and may help explain why later scholars found attractive neither 
the 1950s’ doctrine nor its theory—but it still does not explain the gap 
between the two, nor why later scholars so decisively rejected what had 
occurred during the 1950s.  The larger explanation likely lies in the 
transitory nature of Heroic Managerialism itself.  The product of a 
particular moment, the long 1950s, it flourished only so long as the larger 
societal and economic presuppositions on which it rested held.  When those 
 
 221.  Manning, supra note 171, at 1492. 
 222.  Manning, supra note 171, at 1489. 
 223.  Par value was another of Manning’s peeves, like the appraisal remedy a survivor of 
the nineteenth century that he found played a significant part in the everyday working of 
corporate law while lacking any real justification.  It is perhaps a testament to Manning’s 
diligence and character that he wrote an entire treatise on par value, while claiming that the 
topic was neither “very real [nor] very important.”  BAYLESS MANNING, A CONCISE 
TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL X (2d ed., 1986). 
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larger presuppositions faded, so did heroic managerialism, and proposals 
and visions that once appeared prophetic were left looking utopian or 
merely foolish. 
IV. BEFORE THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE LAW224 
The optimistic version of managerialism did not survive the 1960s. 
Heroic managerialism was not merely the notion that the corporation is a 
social entity, or that its managers should run it for the benefit of 
constituencies in addition to shareholders.  That more narrow conception 
lurked in Berle and Means, survived the 1960s, and can be discerned in the 
anti-takeover statutes of the 1980s, the Progressive corporate law 
scholarship of the 1990s and today’s team production theories of 
corporation law.
225
  The managerialism prevalent in the 1950s required 
something more—a faith that statesman-managers, either today’s or some 
future incarnation, could truly run the corporation in the interests of all, 
linked to the belief that the corporation was a stable, indeed permanent, 
“social institution,” whose existence would continue into the distant future 
(recall Manning’s statement that the corporation is now permanent, the 
shareholders transitory).  Both these views would erode in the 1960s, and 
managerialism would contract “toward a less celebratory mode.”
226
  
Waning faith in corporate management—in managers generally—is so 
clear across the 1960s as almost not to require elaboration.  A broad 
disaffection with giant institutions was one of the hallmarks of protests that 
had become widespread by mid-decade, not only shown by lack of faith in 
corporations but also in a reaction against the other giant institutions 
valorized in the 1950s.  It is telling that the student revolt at the University 
of California at Berkeley in 1964 took as its bête noire Clark Kerr, who was 
 
 224.  See Romano, supra note 3, at 324. 
 225.  See generally Allen, supra note 7, at 271–72 (citing the 1980s as a period in which 
corporate law was revolutionized).  Similar, though by no means identical, ideas appear for 
instance in some of the essays in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence Mitchell ed. 
1995).  Contemporary “stakeholder” theories of corporation law do bear resemblances to 
managerialism, but I think they lack the optimism about management, and the vision of the 
corporation as dominant and “embedded,” that characterized managerialism at its height.  
One could argue that more recent ideas repackage managerialism, notably Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout’s team production theory of corporate law, which depicts a public 
corporation’s board of directors as acting as mediator among different groups, shareholder 
and not, participating in corporate wealth-creation, but under this theory, boards only 
mediate among direct contributors to the corporation and lack the “social ethos” of 1950s 
managerialism.  For an example of managerialism in production theory, see Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 
251–52 (1999). 
 226.  Maier, supra note 87, at 69. 
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not only Chancellor of the University but a prophet of managerial society 
in his 1960 work Industrialism and Industrial Man.
227
  By the early 1970s, 
corporate management was no longer seen as heroic; few outside 
managerial ranks clamored for “business leadership.”  The idea that 
corporations should be managed to benefit many constituencies had not 
disappeared, but management appeared more often as villain than hero in 
these stories, now a group that had to be pressured to run the corporation to 
help various groups, or which sought to shore up its public image by 
emphasizing the role that corporations had to play in solving various social 
problems.
228
  In 1970, when J. Willard Hurst published his still-unequalled 
history of corporation law, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation, it 
was the corporation’s “legitimacy” that featured in the title, a legitimacy no 
longer assumed but that had become an open question.
229
 
Reasons for the passing of heroic managerialism can also be found in 
the evolution of the corporate economy.  Drucker’s Concept of the 
Corporation, a touchstone of managerialism, took as its focus General 
Motors, a “social institution” if ever there was one, with a seemingly 
permanent place atop the industrial order, an army of workers, foremen, 
and middle managers, and factories and factory towns that appeared 
embedded in the landscape.  GM was also, of course, the epitome of the 
multidivisional, decentralized corporation, with a central management staff 
overseeing the activities of fairly autonomous units.
230
  As large as GM 
was, though, it was still chiefly involved in one business—auto 
manufacture—and its different units still appeared to be permanent parts of 
the firm. 
 In the 1960s, new currents appeared in business, as managerial 
entrepreneurs increasingly formed a new kind of business, the 
conglomerate, pieced together from businesses with little obvious 
connection.  Textron, for example, sold “zippers, pens, snowmobiles, 
eyeglass frames, silverware, golf carts, machine tools, helicopters, rocket 
engines, ball bearings, and gas meters,” among other things.
231
  Managers 
of these transitory assemblages did not resemble the corporate statesmen of 
the previous decades, and their specialty was fluid financial acumen that 
 
 227.  See Paddy Riley, Clark Kerr: From the Industrial to the Knowledge Economy, in 
AMERICAN CAPITALISM 82–84 (Nelson Lichtenstein, ed., 2006) (explaining the importance 
of Kerr’s Industrialism and Industrial Man). 
 228.  See Wells, supra note 88, at 111–23 (detailing the historical changes in the view of 
the directors of corporation and the social responsibilities of an organization). 
 229.  HURST, supra note 1, at 1. 
 230.  See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND 457–63 (1977) (detailing the 
management structure of GM). 
 231.  WELLS, supra note 40, at 64 and passim. 
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would allow them to manage seemingly any business while buying and 
selling business units as they saw fit.  The conglomerate was many things, 
but it was not the kind of stable “social institution” that was the imagined 
corporation of the 1950s.  As Charles Maier has pointed out in a slightly 
different context, by the 1960s, a new kind of managerial ideal was 
emerging for a new kind of business: 
[T]he twentieth-century manager entertained an implicitly 
homeostatic vision.  His task was to preserve or restore a high-
level equilibrium, within a firm buffeted by its wider 
environment, or within the firm and the economic environment 
simultaneously.  By the 1970s the assurance of equilibrium 
faded, and a new doctrine of business in constantly cyclical 
evolution became persuasive.
232
 
The kind of heroic managerialism characteristic of the mid-century faded 
from the legal-academic field during the 1960s,
233
 and it left corporation 
law, if possible, even deader than before.  Without guiding assumptions 
about corporations as permanent social institutions, and managers as 
potential statesmen, the arguments that gripped many scholars in the 1950s 
over issues such as constitutionalizing the corporation, or shareholder 
democracy, seemed in later decades either trivial or simply 
incomprehensible.  Heroic managerial ideas were not very useful for 
corporations attempting to navigate the economic problems caused by 
global competition and the decline of American management in the 1970s 
or 1980s.  Searching for more useful tools, corporation law scholars—even 
those still holding onto a more chastened form of managerialism—would 
eventually turn to developments in economics and finance that promised to 
illuminate the corporation in turbulent times, and the ascent of law-and-
economics approaches began.
234
  Only in the late 1970s, when the new 
economic theory of the firm, and innovations from financial economics, 
began to be widely adopted by corporate law scholars, did corporation law 
“as a field of intellectual effort” again stir to life.
235
 
But a turning point may be discerned a bit earlier.  The transition 
between the old corporate law and the new was foreshadowed in 1962, 
when heroic managerialism brushed up against its successor.  That year, 
 
 232.  Maier, supra note 87, at 69. 
 233.  It did not disappear all at once.  See, e.g., David S. Ruder, Public Obligations of 
Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1965) (providing an example of the 
continuance of heroic managerialism during the 1960s). 
 234.  See Romano, supra note 3, at 342 (detailing the changes that law and economics 
brought to corporate law during the 1980s). 
 235.  See Cheffins, supra note 3, at 482 (detailing a change in intellectual treatment of 
the corporate model beginning in the 1970s). 
WELLS - FINALIZED (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2013  12:45 PM 
2013] “CORPORATION LAW IS DEAD” 355 
 
Henry Manne published a groundbreaking attack on managerialism, The 
Higher Criticism of the Modern Corporation, in the Columbia Law 
Review.
236
  Though not fully appreciated at the time—it was published with 
a condescending reply from Berle, and apparently little valued for some 
years thereafter
237
—Manne’s article insisted that corporation law had to be 
understood in “traditional economic terms”
238
 and decisively rejected the 
notion that corporations or managers had escaped the pressures of the 
market.  He argued for the importance of both managerial markets and the 
market for corporate control in shaping managerial and corporate 
behavior.
239
  The same year, then, that Manning declared the death of 
corporation law as an intellectual enterprise, what we could call green 
shoots of its intellectual successors were beginning to appear. 
CONCLUSION 
In his study of recent American thought, the historian Daniel Rodgers 
speaks of his topics as “ideas laid across the messier realities of experience, 
helping to construct its character and possibilities, framing and polarizing 
its meanings.”
240
  So with the ideas of corporate law.  As much as we hope 
those ideas will correctly reflect the legal and economic world as it is (and 
perhaps change it as well), they inevitably abstract from it, and invariably 
abbreviate and distort the messier realities they overlie.  So, too, they 
inevitably change as the legal and economic contexts change, and ideas and 
theories that seemed plausible and even welcome in one era can baffle the 
next.  We can see this in the career of midcentury corporate law. 
As a historical matter, it is of some worth to restore heroic 
managerialism to our account of the development of corporation law, for it 
reminds us that there are very different ways to do corporation law.  While 
Bayless Manning and Henry Manne may have doubted the value of 
corporate law scholarship during the long 1950s, and may even have been 
proven right, they did not appear to speak for most scholars, who busied 
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themselves with questions and concerns shaped or at least inflected by 
managerialism, or simply continued to tinker with the ordinary mechanisms 
of the law.  Corporation law lacked an economic theory of the firm, but it is 
not clear that many scholars thought it needed one.  Seeing the corporation 
as a political and social institution, insulated from competition and 
wielding enormous power, they concluded that political and sociological 
analyses were more useful and timely.  Looking back, and judging that 
corporation law in the 1950s fell short because its practitioners did not take 
approaches more useful in another era, or devote themselves to questions 
that preoccupy us now, we are in danger of failing to understand it on its 
own terms, or to appreciate that every theory of corporate law reflects the 
age within which it was made. 
The account can also remind us that questions corporate law scholars 
now too often cabin off or leave to others
241
 were once central to 
corporation law—questions of the social role and impact of corporations, of 
corporate power, of corporations’ ability to undermine or eclipse 
government.  At the end of a tumultuous decade, these questions deserve 
new consideration. 
 
 
 241.  To say that many scholars cabin off these questions, or do not see them as a valid 
part of “corporate law,” is of course not to say that all do so, and there are certainly scholars 
within corporate law whose work interrogates corporations’ social influence or political 
power. 
